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Abstract. How should we understand de re modal features of
objects, if there are such features? Any answer to the ques-
tion is connected to how we should think about coincident
objects, objects which occupy the same spatio-temporal re-
gion and share the same underlying matter. This thesis is
mainly about the connections between de re modality and
coincidence. My interest in the connections is twofold: First,
how do theories of de re modality interact with theories about
coincidence? Details of interactions are discussed from chap-
ter 2 to chapter 5. Second, do the considerations about de re
modality oﬀer reasons to favour a particular position about
coincidence? And how does this answer contribute to current
meta-ontological debate? These are raised in chapter 1 and
are answered in conclusion.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1. Modality and Coincidence
One of the main topics of this thesis is de re modality. What is de re
modality? The name de re, which means of the thing in Latin, gives some
hint. Roughly speaking, de re modality concerns modal features of objects.
For example, sometimes Socrates is taken to be essentially a human and
accidentally a philosopher; if that is indeed the case, then being essentially
a human and being accidentally a philosopher are the modal features
of Socrates. Another example is that if the doctrine of necessity of identity
is true, then all objects are necessarily self-identical; and being necessarily
self-identical is a modal feature of all objects.
Standardly, de re modality is contrasted with de dicto modality, the
kind of modality of the words (in Latin). The de re-de dicto distinction in
modality1 is characterized by Graeme Forbes as follows:
A formula with modal ... operators is de re iﬀ it contains
a modal ... operator R which has within its scope either
(1) an individual constant, or (2) a free variable, or (3) a
variable bounded by a quantiﬁer not within R's scope. All
other formulae with modal ... operators are de dicto.
Hence ... and `(∀x)Fx' are de dicto, while by (1), `♦Fa',
by (2), `Fx', and by (3) `(∀x)Fx' and `♦(∃x)(Fx&♦Gx)',
are all de re. (1985: 48-9)
1The de re-de dicto distinction is not just about modality. It also applies to, for example,
propositional attitudes.
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According to Forbes's deﬁnition, the de re-de dicto distinction is primarily
a linguistic one, and the diﬀerence between the two is captured by a certain
syntactic feature of sentence, that is the scope of a modal operator.
Nevertheless the linguistic distinction has the following metaphysical im-
plication. Since de re modality is mainly about objects, the semantic values
of de re modal sentences are underpinned by the potentialities and essences
of objects. This is how the de re-de dicto distinction separates the potential-
ities and essences of objects from other modal facts. And the potentialities
and essences of objects are thereby taken to be de re modal features of
objects.
The thesis is not just about de re modality, it also concerns the debate
about coincidence, in which the central question is whether distinct objects
can occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying
matter. Let's call object x and object y coincident objects, if x and y are
distinct, and x and y occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share
the same underlying matter. Given this deﬁnition of coincident objects,
the central question can also be presented as whether there are coincident
objects. Coincidentalists think that there are, while anti-coincidentalists
think that there are none.2
The classical scenario set for the debate is given by Allan Gibbard (1975),
who asks us to consider, for example, a clay statue which is made by putting
two small pieces together and is then destroyed by separating the two pieces.
We have a statue and a lump of clay: Call the statue and the lump of clay
Goliath and Lump1 respectively. Coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists
would disagree about certain identity claims: coincidentalists think that Go-
liath and Lump1 are examples of coincident objects and thereby are com-
mitted to the claim that Goliath and Lump1 are numerically distinct. In
contrast, anti-coincidentalists think that no objects occupy the same spatio-
temporal region and share the same underlying matter, and since ex hypothesi
Goliath and Lump1 do occupy the same region and have the same matter,
anti-coincidentalists are committed to the claim that Goliath and Lump1 are
identical.
2I borrow coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists from Sider (2008). But the two sides
are often labeled diﬀerently. For example, Fine (2003) uses pluralists and monists; and
following Yablo, Bennett (2004b) uses multi-thingers and one-thingers.
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It is worthy clarifying that although the same question can be refor-
mulated as region-centered, that is whether spatio-temporal regions contain
more than one object, (if occupying the same region entails sharing under-
lying matter,3) the main issue here is about metaphysics of material objects
rather than metaphysics of space-time.
It is also worthy clarifying my deﬁnition of coincidence. Firstly, accord-
ing to my deﬁnition, coincidence is an irreﬂexive relation. Although some
philosophers, e.g. Fine (2003), are more lenient regarding reﬂexivity, I ﬁnd
it strange to claim that an object coincides with itself. Secondly, often the
debate is called material constitution rather than coincidence. Goliath
are said to be constituted by Lump1, and the central question is whether
constitution relation is identity relation. But as Fine4 correctly points out,
coincidence is a one-to-one relation while constitution is not, thus the debate
about coincidence and the debate about constitution, if there is one, cannot
be reduced to each other. Moreover, names such as Goliath, Lump1 are
normally thought as singular terms. Hence coincidence rather than consti-
tution accurately characterizes the classical scenario. Thirdly, often coinci-
dence is deﬁned in terms of composition. For example, according to Sider:
x and y are coincident iﬀ x 6=y and for some X s, x and y are
each composed of the X s. (2008: 617, ft.8)
This deﬁnition may cause complexity. Fine remarks:
There is an unfortunate tendency in the literature to deﬁne
coincidents as things with the same parts. But this makes
it too hard for things to coincide. Thus it might be denied
that the statue coincides with the clay on the grounds that
the statue (or the arm of the statue) is a part of the statue
but not a part of the clay. (2003: 198, ft.5)
3However Fine thinks occupying the same region and sharing underlying matter can be
diﬀerent. The former is neither suﬃcient nor necessary for the latter: Thus a loaf of bread
and the bread that compose it are materially yet not spatially coincident ... a water-logged
loaf of bread and the loaf of bread that is water-logged are spatially yet not materially
coincident. (2003 : 198)
4Although the point is often ignored, it is not a piece of alloy but the alloy itself that
can properly be said to constitute or make up a statue. (Fine 2003: 206)
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Thus if there is a debate about whether Goliath and Lump1 are coincident
objects, then there is a similar debate about whether Goliath's arm and
Lump1's arm-shaped part are coincident objects. This is how disagreement
about paradigmatic coincident objects may lead to disagreement about the
composition of those objects. Thus using composition does cause some in-
convenience for discussing the classical scenario.
Finally, it is worthy mentioning that there are other kinds of coincidence.
For material objects, there is a similar debate about temporal coincidence,
that is the debate about whether distinct objects occupy the same spatial
region and share the same underlying matter at a time. Furthermore, Fine
(2003) thinks it also makes sense to ask whether distinct objects occupy the
same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter in every
world they exist (if they exist in some world and exist in the same worlds).
Nevertheless, coincidence is not conﬁned to material objects, and similar
problems can be raised for all material beings, e.g. events. Thus, there are
also questions like whether distinct events occupy the same spatial-temporal
region. In the thesis I will not discuss other kinds of coincidence directly. But
since diﬀerent kinds of coincidence share a similar structure, the discussion
below, mutatis mutandis, applies to other kinds of coincidence.
De re modality and coincidence are thus the two main topics of the thesis.
The reason for putting the two together is that the discussions about de
re modality and the discussions about coincidence are entangled with each
other. Since general de re modality subsumes the modal features of coinci-
dent objects, any speciﬁc view on de re modality would have an impact on
the modal features of tentative coincident objects. And diﬀerent accounts
of de re modality may lead to diﬀerent accounts about coincidence. Con-
versely, diﬀerent views on coincidence may commit us to diﬀerent views on
modal features of tentative coincident objects, which is linked to accounts of
general de re modality.
The thesis concerns the connections between de re modality and coin-
cidence. Connections between the two are not hard to ﬁnd, because robust
modal intuitions about coincident objects are available. For example, in the
Goliath and Lump1 case, there are strong intuitions such as Goliath can-
not survive being squashed and Lump1 can survive being squashed. Now
suppose that the modal predicate can survive being squashed denotes the
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modal property being capable of surviving being squashed, then Go-
liath and Lump1 have diﬀerent modal properties: Goliath lacks but Lump1
has the property being capable of surviving being squashed. Given
Leibniz's Law, that is no object both has and lacks the very same property,
Goliath and Lump1 must be counted as distinct objects, and coincidentalism
is true.
This is how coincidentalism is connected with a certain understanding of
de re modality. Besides, coincidentalism is said to have the grounding prob-
lem: roughly, since coincident objects diﬀer modally but not nonmodally,
the modal features of coincident objects are ungrounded. It therefore seems
that coincidentalism is also connected with ungrounded modality.
Furthermore, thinking that the predicate can survive being squashed
denotes the property being capable of surviving being squashed causes
trouble for making sense of anti-coincidentalism. As I showed above, this
understanding, together with Leibniz's Law, implies that Goliath and Lump1
are distinct, which is incompatible with anti-coincidentalism. Due to the use
of Leibniz's Law, the argument is traditionally called the argument from
Leibniz's Law. Hence for anti-coincidentalists who don't want to abandon
Leibniz's Law, an alternative account of de re modality is needed in order
to defend their view about coincidence. This is how anti-coincidentalism is
connected with a certain understanding of de re modality.
The above connections as well as their further implications are scruti-
nized in the main body of the thesis. Put it in another way, the thesis
concentrates on the details of the connections between modality and coinci-
dence. By concentrating on those connections, I do not pick any particular
side about de re modality nor about coincidence in the thesis. I believe the
debates about both issues, if they can be resolved at all, can only be resolved
by evidence. And my ambition in this thesis is just to provide objective ev-
idence for diﬀerent sides: I am not committed to arguing for any particular
theory.
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1.2. Meta-Ontology
Recently, the legitimacy of some metaphysical debates5 is challenged from
meta-ontological perspectives. It is argued that those debates should be dis-
missed due to certain metaphysical, or epistemic, or linguistic considerations.
And the debate about coincidence is among them. According to Bennett
(2009), there are three ways of trivializing the debate about coincidence.
The metaphysical way of trivializing the debate is to argue that there is no
matter of fact whether there are coincident objects. The epistemic way of
trivializing the debate is to argue that in principle, no evidence can be found
to resolve the debate between coincidentalism and anti-coincidentalism. The
linguistic way of trivializing the debate is to argue that there is no real dis-
pute between coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists, rather their dispute
is merely verbal.
As I mentioned earlier, the primary interest of this thesis is the con-
nection between modality and coincidence. This connection may shed some
light on certain meta-ontological debates about coincidence.
Meta-ontological anti-realism about coincidence is the view that there is
no matter of fact whether there are coincident objects. If meta-ontological
anti-realism is true, since there is no corresponding matter of fact, in prin-
ciple no evidence can be found in favour of coincidentalism or in favour of
anti-coincidentalism. By contraposition, one way of arguing against meta-
ontological anti-realism it to ﬁnd such evidence. And the connections be-
tween modality and coincidence may be able to oﬀer this kind of evidence.
This is how certain connection between coincidence and modality can be
used to defeat meta-ontological anti-realism about coincidence.
Meta-ontological skepticism about coincidence is the view that in princi-
ple, no evidence can be found in favour of one side over the other. This view
is proposed by Bennett:
There do not appear to be any real grounds for choosing
between the competing positions about either composition or
constitution. We are not justiﬁed in believing either side.
These are basically cases of underdetermination of theory by
evidence. (2009: 71)
5The most discussed debates are composition and the ontology of numbers. See Chalmers,
Manley, and Wasserman(eds.), 2009.
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As Bennett correctly points out, though both meta-ontological skepticism
and meta-ontological anti-realism hold that no evidence can settle the debate
about coincidence, a meta-ontological skeptic does not need to commit to
meta-ontological anti-realism. It is possible that there is a matter of fact
as to whether there are coincident objects while the fact is epistemically
inaccessible. Nevertheless, the above strategy to defeat meta-ontological
anti-realism can also be used to defeat meta-ontological skepticism, for both
deny that the debate about coincidence can be resolved by evidence. In
other words, if a certain connection between coincidence and modality is
able to oﬀer reason to choose coincidentalism over anti-coincidentalism, or
vice versa; then meta-ontological skepticism about coincidence is false.
Linguistic deﬂationism about coincidence6 is the view that the disagreement
between coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists is not substantive, rather it
is merely verbal. There are just prima facie conﬂicting utterances about the
existence of coincident objects; but there are no corresponding incompatible
propositions about the existence of those objects.
Unlike meta-ontological anti-realism and meta-ontological skepticism, if
linguistic deﬂationism about coincidence is true, then my whole thesis is in
danger. This is because by focusing on the connection between coincidence
and modality I do presume that the disagreement between coincidentalists
and anti-coincidentalists is substantive, and evidence plays important roles
even if evidence fails to resolve the debate. On the contrary, the goal of lin-
guistic deﬂationists, if there is one, is to resolve the debate about coincidence
by making the two parties come to a verbal agreement. This has nothing to
do with evidence. Therefore, it would be better if I could successfully argue
against this particular way of trivializing the debate about coincidence.
Let's ﬁrst see the primary reason for taking the debate about coincidence
to be substantive. Use Goliath and Lump1 as an illustration, coincidentalists
and anti-coincidentalists would utter (1) and (2) respectively:
(1) Coincidentalists:
a. Goliath exists.
b. Lump1 exists.
6Ref. Bennett, 2009; Hirsch, 2002a & 2005.
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c. Goliath and Lump1 are not identical.
(2) Anti-coincidentalists: .
a. Goliath exists.
b. Lump1 exists.
c. Goliath and Lump1 are identical.
Given (1-a), (1-b), (2-a) and (2-b), it is natural to think that coincidentalists
and anti-coincidentalists agree with the existence claims about Goliath and
Lump1. Likewise, given (1-c) and (2-c), it is natural to think that they dis-
agree about the identity claim between Goliath and Lump1. Since disagree-
ment about identity is paradigmatically non-verbal, there is a substantive
dispute.
Let's then see how, according to linguistic deﬂationists, the above dis-
agreement is trivialized as a merely verbal dispute. There are two ways of
doing that. One is to argue that the identity disagreement is actually verbal:
the sentences such as Goliath and Lump1 are not identical and Goliath
and Lump1 are identical can be true at the same time. Goliath and Lump1
are identical relative to a thing while they are not identical relative to an-
other thing. However, this way of trivializing the debate about coincidence
is too radical. I don't believe anyone would trade widely-accepted absolute
identity just for the illegitimacy of the debate about coincidence.
The other way of trivializing the debate is to argue that coincidentalists
and anti-coincidentalists actually verbally disagree with the existence claims;
thus though (1-a) and (2-a), (1-b) and (2-b) are the same utterances, they
are underpinned by diﬀerent propositions. Coincidentalists link the existence
claims to one fashion of existence while anti-coincidentalists link the exis-
tence claims to another fashion of existence. And thereby the identity claims
such as (1-c) and (2-c) are just linked to diﬀerent fashions of existence, which
is the reason why coincidentalists' identity claims and anti-coincidentalists'
identity claims may not be incompatible. This strategy is often called quan-
tiﬁer variance, for under this interpretation, identity claims like (1-c) and
(2-c) are attached to diﬀerent domains of discourse.
I don't believe quantiﬁer variance does a good job in trivializing the
debate about coincidence; but I do admit that the above strategy is at
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least prima facie defensible. And indeed, quantiﬁer variance has been well-
discussed in the current literature.7 Though objections to quantiﬁer variance
do ﬁt my current interest, that is to argue against linguistic deﬂationism,
those objections are not necessary. By this I mean, besides utterances like
(1) and (2), there might be other utterances oﬀering reasons to think that
the debate about coincidence is substantive. And if there are such claims,
then even quantiﬁer variance may not be able to trivialize the debate.
Indeed, coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists not only say things about
existence, but also things about reference. Again, use Goliath and Lump1
as an illustration, coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists would utter (3)
and (4) respectively:
(3) Coincidentalists:
a. Goliath refers.
b. Lump1 refers.
c. The reference of Goliath and the reference of Lump1
are not identical.
(4) Anti-coincidentalists:
a. Goliath refers.
b. Lump1 refers.
c. The reference of Goliath and the reference of Lump1
are identical.
Similar to (1) and (2), given (3-a), (3-b), (4-a) and (4-b), it is natural to
think that coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists agree with the certain
reference claims about Goliath and Lump1. Likewise, given (1-c) and (2-c),
it is natural to think they disagree with the identity claim between Goliath
and Lump1. And since identity disagreement is paradigmatically non-verbal,
there is a substantive dispute.
How could linguistic deﬂationists respond? They either need to deny
the identity disagreement between coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists
is verbal, or deny that coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists agree with
7See Hirsch, 2002a & 2002b & 2005 for the proposal of quantiﬁer variance; see Bennett,
2009 and Sider, 2009, for the arguments against the proposal.
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certain reference claims. If it is the former, then similar to the above case
linguistic deﬂationists need to trade widely-accepted absolute identity for
the illegitimacy of the debate about coincidence. If it is the latter, then they
need to claim that, for example, Goliath refers relative to one thing in the
coincidentalists' mouth while it refers relative to another thing in the anti-
coincidentalists' mouth. That is, linguistic deﬂationists need to endorse an
account, according to which, reference is relative! Relative reference seems
more unorthodox and more problematic than relative identity. This is be-
cause not only are disagreements about reference, like disagreements about
identity, paradigmatically non-verbal, but also we don't yet have an theory
about relative reference. At least for linguistic deﬂationists who are happy
with relative identity, Peter Geach's8 theory can be borrowed to make sense
of the claim. But for linguistic deﬂationists who are happy with relative
reference, it is doubtful that their claim about relative reference makes any
sense. Furthermore, recall that in the case (1) & (2), most linguistic de-
ﬂationists are reluctant to endorse relative identity, and this is the reason
why they search for an alternative and appeal to quantiﬁer variance. If rel-
ative identity is not welcomed, then relative reference, which is worse than
relative identity, should not be welcomed. In sum, linguistic deﬂationism
about coincidence need to trade widely-accepted absolute identity or trade
widely-accepted absolute reference just for the illegitimacy of the debate
about coincidence. Since either way, the prize is too high, the debate about
coincidence should be taken as substantive rather than merely verbal.9
1.3. Roadmap
The rest of the thesis is arranged as follows:
8See Geach, P.T., 1980, Reference and Generality (third edition). Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
9Quantiﬁer variance also appears in the meta-ontological debate about composition. How-
ever, relative reference cannot be used to bypass the discussion about quantiﬁer variance
in composition. This is because, in coincidence, subject terms, such as Goliath, are sin-
gular terms; and in composition, subject terms, such as table, in one theory has plural
reference, such as atoms arranged in table-wise, while in another theory it has singular
reference, such as a table. Since the relation between singular reference and plural ref-
erence is deﬁnitely not identity, linguistic deﬂationists about composition do not need to
choose between relative identity and relative reference.
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• Chapter 2 analyzes the standard objection to coincidentalism, the
grounding problem. It also preliminarily discusses three possible
ways for coincidentalists to avoid the problem.
• Chapter 3 continues the research on the grounding problem. It
focuses on coincidentalists' ﬁrst tentative answer to the grounding
problem, and shows this answer leads to a dead-end.
• Chapter 4 also continues the research on the grounding problem.
It concerns the second and the third tentative answer to the prob-
lem, and argues both answers fail.
• Chapter 5 shows the constraints on anti-coincidentalists' account
about de re modality, as well as the results of those constraints.
• Conclusion summarizes the connections between coincidence and
de re modality discussed from chapter 2 to chapter 5. Those con-
nections reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences between coincidentalism and
anti-coincidentalism, and thereby can be used to argue against cer-
tain dismissive meta-ontological attitudes towards the debate about
coincidence.
My intention is to arrange the thesis in a coherent fashion. This is be-
cause, though each chapter has its own concentration, as reader will see, the
contents of diﬀerent chapters are tightly connected in one way or another.
Nevertheless, there is one disadvantage of this way of arranging the thesis,
that is, individual chapters are less readable as stand-alone papers. For read-
ers who prefer to read chapters separately, the information about previous
and following chapters can be found in abstract and upshot sections. And
for readers with interest in speciﬁc topics, here is a rough guide:
• For those with an interest in the grounding problem, please
read chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, and section 5.4;
• For those with an interest in the argument from Leibniz's
Law, please read section 5.1, section 5.2 and section 5.3;
• For those with an interest in coincidentalism, please read chapter
2, chapter 3, and chapter 4;
• For those with an interest in anti-coincidentalism, please read
chapter 5;
• For those with an interest in meta-ontology, please read section
1.2 and conclusion;
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• For those with an interest in de re modality, please read chapter
4, chapter 5;
• For those with an interest in identity and indiscernibility,
please read chapter 3.
CHAPTER 2
The Grounding Problem
Abstract. Chapter 2 articulates the standard objection against coinci-
dentalism, the grounding problem. I ﬁrst analyze the grounding problem
in terms of three steps and two assumptions. The analysis sheds light
on how coincidentalists as well as anti-coincidentalists are constrained
by the problem. I then articulate each step in turn. Correspond to
the three steps of the grounding problem, three tentative answers for
coincidentalists are developed.
2.1. The Grounding Problem
Coincidentalists think that there are coincident objects: the objects are nu-
merically distinct, but occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share
the same underlying matter. The paradigm case is Allan Gibbard's (1975)
Goliath and Lump1: Consider a clay statue which is made by putting two
small pieces together and is then destroyed by separating the two pieces. We
have a statue and a lump of clay: Call the statue Goliath and the lump of
clay Lump1. Coincidentalists think that Goliath and Lump1 are distinct,
and ex hypothesi Goliath and Lump1 occupy the same spatio-temporal re-
gion and share the same underlying matter. So there are coincident objects
and coincidentalism is true.
There is one key move made above to reach coincidentalism. It is claimed
that objects like Goliath and Lump1 are distinct objects. But are they
indeed? Coincidentalists take the answer to be yes, because objects like
Goliath and Lump1 have diﬀerent modal features: Goliath lacks the modal
property being capable of surviving being squashed, while Lump1 has
the modal property being capable of surviving being squashed. This
is supported by ordinary modal talk:
(1) Goliath cannot survive being squashed.
13
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(2) Lump1 can survive being squashed.
After all, the most natural way to explain the data is to say that the one-
place predicate can survive being squashed denotes a monadic property
being capable of surviving being squashed, and conclude that Lump1
but not Goliath has this property. According to Leibniz's Law, one object
cannot both have and lack the same property, thus Goliath and Lump1 are
distinct objects. Modal features are used to diﬀerentiate coincident objects.
However, coincidentalists are said to face the grounding problem1: Brieﬂy,
given the modal diﬀerences between coincident objects, what grounds the
modal features of these objects? The grounders cannot be the nonmodal
features of the objects. Since coincident objects occupy the same spatio-
temporal region and share the same underlying matter, there is no nonmodal
diﬀerence between them. And if the grounders are indeed the nonmodal
features, then there would be no modal diﬀerence between coincident objects.
In this way, it is thought that coincidentalists are unable to answer the
grounding question and thus are committed to the problematic view that
modality is ungrounded.
The grounding problem is treated seriously by both parties in this dis-
pute. Even Kit Fine, as a coincidentalist, admits:
... there are several arguments that my opponent might oﬀer
in favour of identity. The most powerful to my mind is the
metaphysical argument: if a thing and its matter are not the
same, then in what does the diﬀerence between them consist?
(2003: 197)2
Thus the problem is supposed to act as a leverage in the debate about coinci-
dent objects. Due to its signiﬁcance, it is worth asking whether the problem
is indeed a knock-down objection from anti-coincidentalists, or put it in an-
other way, whether coincidentalists can solve the problem. And if they can,
it is also worth asking how the problem can be solved. I think the deep
structure of the problem helps answer the above questions.
1See Bennett (2004b), Burke (1992), Heller (1990), Olson (2001), Sosa (1987), and Zim-
merman (1995).
2Fine uses diﬀerent terminology. For him Lump1 is Goliath's matter.
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The following is my understanding of the the deep structure of the grounding
problem. Firstly, three steps are made in order to reach the ﬁnal charge:
(S1) There are coincident objects, and coincident objects diﬀer modally
from one another.
(S2) If there are modal diﬀerences between coincident objects, then
the modal features of these objects are ungrounded.
(S3) Ungrounded modal features are problematic.
Blocking any one of the steps above would help solve the problem. Corre-
spondingly, for coincidentalists, there are three diﬀerent approaches to the
grounding problem:
(R1) There are coincident objects, and coincident objects do not diﬀer
modally from one another.
(R2) Modal diﬀerences between coincident objects and grounded modal-
ity are compatible.
(R3) Ungrounded modal features are not problematic.
It is worth emphasizing that only showing (R1) or (R2) holds is not yet
a satisfying answer to the grounding problem: coincidentalists are still re-
quired to explain the manner of modality's being ungrounded or grounded.
And there might be other ways of leading to a similar conclusion. In other
words, even if there is no modal diﬀerence between coincident objects, that
is (S1) is blocked, the modal features of coincident objects might still be
problematically grounded or problematically ungrounded. Likewise, even if
the modal features of coincident objects are grounded, that is (S2) is blocked,
these modal features might just be problematically grounded. Either way,
there is a similar problem about the modal features. Hence, coincidentalists
who want to block either (S1) or (S2) carry the burden of showing that the
modal features of coincident objects are unproblematic grounded or unprob-
lematically ungrounded.
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Strategy Approach to the Grounding Problem
The 1st strategy : (R1): To deny modal diﬀerence.
Blocking steps to avoid (R2): To ground modality.
the grounding problem (R3): To make sense of ungrounded modality.
Table 2.1.1 Replies to the Grounding Problem - 1
The three steps above do not complete the deep structure of the ground-
ing problem, because as I mentioned earlier, the grounding problem is used as
leverage in the debate between coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists. In
other words, the supposed role of the grounding problem is to oﬀer a reason
to prefer anti-coincidentalism to coincidentalism. Thus, anti-coincidentalists
should not have similar problems. After all, since the ﬁnal charge of the
grounding problem is about the manner of modality's being ungrounded or
grounded rather than coincident objects per se. In addition to (S1), (S2)
and (S3), anti-coincidentalists need the following statements to be true:
(A1) Modality can be grounded if there are no coincident objects; and
(A2) Grounded modal features are not problematic.
If not, the grounding problem backﬁres. If (A1) does not hold, then given
(S3), anti-coincidentalists also have problematically ungrounded modality.
If (A2) does not hold, given (A1), then anti-coincidentalists have problem-
atically grounded modality. Either way, anti-coincidentalists are not better
than coincidentalists regarding the manner of modality's being ungrounded
or grounded.
But there is a way for anti-coincidentalists to reformulate the grounding
problem. In the case that (A1) does not hold, they can replace (S3) with
(S3') If there are coincident objects and modality is ungrounded, then
modality is problematically ungrounded.
And argue that
(A3) If there are no coincident objects, then modality is unproblem-
atically ungrounded.
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When both coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists admit ungrounded modal-
ity, the only way to show that one theory is better than its rival theory is to
argue that one's modality is ungrounded in a good manner while the rival's
modality is ungrounded in a bad manner.
It is interesting to notice that, coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists,
although with diﬀerent goals (to avoid the charge for the former and to avoid
backﬁre for the latter), are constrained in a similar way by the grounding
problem. That is, in order to avoid the problem, both need to show:
(C) If there are no coincident objects, then either modality is unprob-
lematically grounded or it is unproblematically ungrounded.
Given this general constraint, aside from blocking a step of the ground-
ing problem, there is a diﬀerent strategy for coincidentalists to answer the
grounding problem. Suppose that coincidentalists fail to block all three
steps, but succeed in showing their opponents also have the problem, then
they can answer the problem by trivializing its role. It can be argued that
the grounding problem is general; since everyone has it, the problem should
not be used to argue against coincidentalism. Thus, the fourth approach to
the grounding problem is to argue:
(R4) Anti-coincidentalists cannot make sense of (C), therefore they
have the grounding problem.
Strategy Approach to the Grounding Problem
The 1st strategy : (R1): To deny modal diﬀerence.
Blocking steps to avoid (R2): To ground modality.
the grounding problem (R3): To make sense of ungrounded modality.
The 2nd strategy : (R4): To argue that anti-coincidentalists
Backﬁring anti-coincidentalism themselves have a similar grounding problem.
Table 2.1.2 Replies to the Grounding Problem - 2
It is worth mentioning that blocking a step and attacking anti-coincidentalists
are mutually independent strategies. This is why coincidentalists might be
able to do both, which provides a third strategy for coincidentalists to answer
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the grounding problem. Aggressive coincidentalists might want to ironically
argue that the grounding problem actually serves as leverage to prefer co-
incidentalism. In order to do that, they need to show (i) coincidentalists
do not have the grounding problem by appealing to (R1) or (R2) or (R3),
and (ii) anti-coincidentalists do have the grounding problem by appealing to
(R4). Thus, the three additional approaches of replying to the grounding
problem are:
(R5) (R1) + (R4).
(R6) (R2) + (R4).
(R7) (R3) + (R4).
Strategy Approach to the grounding problem
The 1st strategy : (R1): To deny modal diﬀerence.
Blocking steps to avoid (R2): To ground modality.
the grounding problem (R3): To make sense of ungrounded modality.
The 2nd strategy : (R4): To argue that anti-coincidentalists
Backﬁring anti-coincidentalism themselves have a similar grounding problem.
The 3rd strategy : (R5): (R1) + (R4).
A combination of the ﬁrst (R6): (R2) + (R4).
and the second strategy (R7): (R3) + (R4).
Table 2.1.3 Replies to the Grounding Problem - 3
In total, for coincidentalists, there are three strategies to answer the
grounding problem. The ﬁrst strategy is to dismiss the grounding problem
by arguing coincidentalists do not have it; the second strategy is to dismiss
the grounding problem by arguing anti-coincidentalists also have it; the third
strategy, which is a combination of the ﬁrst and the second, is to favour
coincidentalism by using the grounding problem as a leverage. Since there
are three diﬀerent ways of avoiding the grounding problem, there are seven
diﬀerent approaches coincidentalists could attempt in order to reply to the
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grounding problem. Although, the discussion about (R5) to (R7) can be
reduced to the discussion about (R1) to (R4).
Last but not least, from a wider perspective, the above grounding problem
may not the only grounding problem. Although modal features are good at
diﬀerentiating coincident objects, there might still be other equally eligible
candidates for the same job. Indeed, coincidentalists also think that coinci-
dent objects diﬀer in kind properties, such as being a statue, and evaluative
properties, such as being well-made, being Romanesque.3 And similar
grounding problems can be raised for coincidentalists: what grounds the kind
properties and evaluative properties of objects? Surely, the answer cannot
be objects' spatio-temporal properties, or underlying matter, or any features
grounded in spatio-temporal properties or underlying matter; because coin-
cident objects diﬀer in kind and evaluative properties, but diﬀer in neither
spatio-temporal properties nor underlying matter. But if the answer is not
spatio-temporal properties and underlying matter, what else it could be? In
this way, it is clear to see that there are grounding problems and the problem
about modality is only one of them.
So exactly how many grounding problems are faced by coincidentalists?
The number of the grounding problem(s) depends on the diﬀerences coinci-
dentalists admit. For example, if modal diﬀerences are the only diﬀerences
between coincident objects, then there is just one grounding problem. If
modal, kind, and evaluative diﬀerences are the only diﬀerences between co-
incident objects, then there are three grounding problems. And if there are
diﬀerences in other features of coincident objects, then there are also other
grounding problems for those features.
Albeit there are diﬀerent grounding problems for coincidentalists, all of
them do share a basic structure. By this I mean, the above analysis, mutatis
mutandis, applies to other grounding problems as well.
Nevertheless, coincidentalists do carry the burden of answering all of
them, if they recognize the corresponding diﬀerences. This task can be
completed in two ways. One is to give separate answers to diﬀerent problems.
The other one is to give an united answer, that is to privilege one feature
to ground the rest, and then to give an answer to the grounding problem
for the privileged feature. It is hard to judge which way is better to answer
3Ref. Fine (2003).
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all the problems. In principle, if a reply like (R1), that is to eliminate
the diﬀerences, works for one feature, then very likely it works for other
features. If that is indeed the case, then coincidentalists can give separate
answers to diﬀerent problems by using the same strategy. The ﬁrst way of
answering the problems seems ﬁne in this case. In contrast, if a reply like
(R2) or (R3), that is to argue that the feature is grounded or ungrounded in
an unproblematic manner, works for one feature, then coincidentalists can
privilege this feature and ground other features in the privileged feature.
The second way of answering the problems seems ﬁne in this case.
The rest of chapter 2 is used to articulate the three steps of the grounding
problem. By doing so, we will be able to see how the corresponding tentative
replies, which are supposed to avoid the grounding problem for coinciden-
talists, are developed. Whether those partially-developed replies avoid the
grounding problem for coincidentalists will be discussed in chapter 3 ((R1))
and chapter 4 ((R2) & (R3)). The issue whether anti-coincidentalists have
the grounding problem will be considered in chapter 5 ((R4)).
2.2. The First Step
As I have shown above, the ﬁrst step of the grounding problem is:
(S1) There are coincident objects, and coincident objects diﬀer modally.
Coincidentalists might be suggested to block (S1) and avoid the grounding
problem. To be more precise, the strategy is to argue:
(i) There are coincident objects; and
(ii) Coincident objects do not diﬀer modally.
(i) sticks to coincidentalism, and (ii) denies modal diﬀerences between coin-
cident objects. So far, so good.
Because of (ii), coincidentalists need to deny that objects like Goliath
and Lump1 have diﬀerent modal properties. But recall that having diﬀerent
modal properties was the reason for taking objects like Goliath and Lump1
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to be distinct. Without this, it is doubtful whether objects like Goliath and
Lump1 are distinct. So it is doubtful whether there are indeed coincident
objects. In short, given (ii), what is the reason to think that (i) is true?
A less plausible reply is to insist on (i) without oﬀering any explanation
of why coincident objects are distinct. It is less plausible, because if it
is licensed, I am also lisened to think that, for example, there are actually
numerous overlapping laptops in front of me right now. It is just a brute fact
that these overlapping laptops are numerically distinct; and no explanation
of distinctness is need. This price might be too high for coincidentalists,
after all most people would ﬁnd themselves uncomfortable with indiscernible
overlapping objects.4 So it would be better if coincidentalists argue that:
(iii) Coincident objects are diﬀerentiated.
(iii) replaces the role modal diﬀerences play and oﬀers reasons to think (i) is
true.
One natural way of endorsing (iii) is to claim that coincident objects are
not diﬀerentiated by modal features but by something else. And admittedly,
there might be things other than modal features qualifying the job. As I
mentioned, it has also been argued that coincident objects have diﬀerent kind
properties and diﬀerent evaluative properties. Thus, coincidentalists might
try to use kind or evaluative diﬀerences to diﬀerentiate coincident objects.
However, this move does not exempt coincidentalists from the grounding
problem. The original grounding problem about modality is simply diverted
to similar problems about other features. For example, if kind diﬀerences
are used to diﬀerentiate coincident objects, it still can be asked that what
grounds, say, Goliath's being a statue and Lump1's being a lump of
clay.
4Interestingly, a similar but diﬀerent strategy is used by della Rocca (2005) to defend
the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (a.k.a PII) , that is, if two things share all the
same properties, then the two are identical. The classical counterexample of PII is Max
Black's (1953) two spheres: a symmetric universe only contains two spheres which are
qualitatively indiscernible but distinct. Della Rocca argues that if the opponents of PII
grant counterexamples like the two spheres, then they should also grant crazy cases like
twenty spheres: twenty distinct but completely overlapping spheres in one spatio-temporal
region. By contraposition, if one wants to avoid crazy twenty spheres, then one also has
to reject two spheres and no longer has counterexamples to PII.
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That is how we are able to see the root of the grounding problem is not
MODAL diﬀerence, but modal DIFFERENCE. Appealing to other diﬀer-
ences does not really ﬁx the problem. The real issue here is whether two
objects can be diﬀerentiated without leading to diﬀerences. So the speciﬁc
strategy of blocking the ﬁrst step of the grounding problem(s) is to argue:
(ii_) Coincident objects do not diﬀer in x -features; and
(iii_) Coincident objects are diﬀerentiated by x -features.
Arguing for both (ii_) and (iii_) at one time may seem to be puzzling and
even insane. After all, without the diﬀerences in x -features, how two objects
are diﬀerentiated by x -features? I do think that (ii_) and (iii_) are incom-
patible, and it is a right move to raise the above question. Nevertheless, this
strategy is actually treated seriously by some philosophers. For example,
Theodore Sider (2008) tries to use this to answer the grounding problem. So
even for those who ﬁnd puzzling at the ﬁrst sight, it would be better to keep
an open mind before a thorough and careful study.
Since the real issue here is about diﬀerence and diﬀerentiation, what the
x -features are is less relevant to the outcome. Put it in another way, if a
strategy works for a-features, then it can be borrowed for b-features, and vice
versa. Thus for simplicity, I will stick to modal features of objects. Mutatis
mutandis, the discussion below applies to other features as well. Now the
task for coincidentalists is to make sense of:
(ii) Coincident objects do not diﬀer modally; and
(iii+) Coincident objects are diﬀerentiated by modal features.
This is the partially-developed strategy to block the ﬁrst step of the ground-
ing problem. And whether this tentative answer works will be discussed in
chapter 3.
2.3. The Second Step
The second step of the grounding problem is:
2.3. THE SECOND STEP 23
(S2) If there are modal diﬀerences between coincident objects, then
the modal features of these objects are ungrounded.
The reason, according to anti-coincidentalists, is supposed to be straight-
forward: Brieﬂy, since coincident objects occupy the same spatio-temporal
region and share the same underlying matter, they do not diﬀer nonmodally.
Suppose that the modal features of coincident objects are indeed grounded
in the nonmodal features of those objects, then since there is no nonmodal
diﬀerence, there is no modal diﬀerence. Thus, if modality is grounded, there
is no modal diﬀerence between coincident objects. By contraposition, if
there are modal diﬀerences between coincident objects, then modality is
ungrounded. Despite its intuitive appeal, the above argument need some
clariﬁcations:
(i) The ﬁrst clariﬁcation is about the grounding relation, which can be
understood in two ways. According to a strong notion, the grounding relation
is similar to determination; the grounders are (metaphysically) suﬃcient
for the groundees. According to a weak notion, the grounding relation is
similar to dependence; the grounders are (metaphysically) necessary for the
groundees. Which one is used in the grounding problem? Surely it cannot
be the weak one, because the weak notion does tolerate diﬀerent groundees
having same grounders.
Sometimes the grounding problem is presented in terms of supervenience.
It has been argued that since coincidentalists fail to supervene the modal on
the nonmodal, they have to accept ungrounded modality. This way of pre-
senting the grounding problem might cause people to think that the ground-
ing relation is one of supervenience relations. For example, Sider (1999)
tries to answer the grounding problem by replacing strong supervenience
with weak global supervenience5. Sider argues although coincidentalists fail
to hold a strong supervenience relation between the modal and the non-
modal, they can still claim a weak global supervenience between the two.
And if grounding is understood in terms of weak global supervenience, then
coincidentalists could answer the grounding problem. However, Sider's an-
swer does not work. Both Bennett (2004a) and Shagrir (2002) show that
5... roughly: if there exists at least one nonmodal isomorphism between two possible
worlds, then there exists at least one modal isomorphism between those worlds. (Sider,
2008: 614)
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weak global supervenience is too weak to capture the idea of grounding,
and the grounding problem remains.6
But this does not mean that the grounding problem cannot be presented
in terms of supervenience, because supervenience failure does imply ground-
ing failure. Supervenience is used as an argumentation strategy, which is
called FIST (argument by appeal to a false implied supervenience thesis)
by McLaughlin7. Roughly, since grounding is stronger than supervenience,
the grounding of A in B implies the supervenience of A on B. By contra-
position, the failure of the latter implies the failure of the former. Thus,
supervenience failure rather than supervenience success is what really mat-
ters in the grounding problem. Because anti-coincidentalists already have
strong supervenience failure, no matter how many other supervenience re-
lations are hold between the modal and the nonmodal, coincidentalists still
face the grounding problem.
(ii) The second clariﬁcation is about the groundees of the grounding rela-
tion, modal features of objects.
It is sometimes argued that coincidentalists can answer the grounding
problem, because the modal diﬀerences between coincident objects can be
grounded by using something like the following principle:
(GMD) There are properties F such that if F is instantiated at a spatio-
temporal region, then both essentially F and accidentally F
are also instantiated at the region.
Admittedly, the instantiations of essentially F and accidentally F might
be grounded in the instantiation of F ; and in this way the modal diﬀerence
between essentially F and accidentally F is grounded in a nonmodal
property F . But even so, the grounding problem remains unsolved, because
the principle above does not tell which object in the region has essentially
F and which has accidentally F . Recall the second step of the problem,
modal diﬀerences are used in order to show the modal features of objects
6Even Sider later admits that Bennett and Shagrir's criticisms are successful: I grant
Bennett and Shagrir's criticisms: if there really exist modal properties and relations, and
if these are not brute (an assumption I will not question), then, I concede, these must
strongly globally supervene on nonmodal properties and relations. (Sider, 2008: 614)
7Ref. McLaughlin and Bennett (2010).
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are ungrounded. And whether modal diﬀerences themselves are grounded or
not is just another issue.8
(iii) The third clariﬁcation is about the grounders of the grounding rela-
tion, nonmodal features of objects. Recall
(S2) If there are modal diﬀerences between coincident objects, then
the modal features of these objects are ungrounded.
It is worth noticing that two claims are made in order to reach (S2)'s con-
clusion:
(G1) Modal features of objects are not grounded in nonmodal features
of objects.
(G2) Nonmodal features are the only candidate grounders of modal
features.
Thus there are two ways of blocking (S2). One is to show that the modal
is grounded in the nonmodal. The other is to show that modal features are
grounded in other features.
Let's consider nonmodal features ﬁrst. Frankly, it is not clear what anti-
coincidentalists mean by nonmodal. The name itself suggests a negative
understanding, that is, nonmodal features are not modal features. It is un-
controversial that this constraint is necessary. But it is controversial whether
the constraint is suﬃcient. Or put it in other way, do anti-coincidentalists'
nonmodal features include all features which are not modal? I think the
most likely answer is no. It is contentious whether there are identity prop-
erties, such as being a (a is a particular). Suppose that there are identity
properties, then identity properties are not modal. But anti-coincidentalists
would want to keep identity properties out of their nonmodal features, for
coincident objects do diﬀer in their identity properties. Goliath but not
Lump1 has the property being Goliath; Lump1 but not Goliath has the
property being Lump1. Moreover, it is also contentious whether kind or
evaluative properties are modal. If they are not, then coincident objects do
8For more information regarding this reply, see Rea (1997) and Zimmerman (1995).
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diﬀer nonmodally in this way. Thus, modal features of objects and anti-
coincidentalists' nonmodal features of objects might not be complement to
each other.
Nevertheless, the way in which the grounding problem is presented sug-
gests a positive understanding of the nonmodal. Anti-coincidentalists think
that coincident objects do not diﬀer nonmodally, because they occupy the
same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter. Thus,
no matter what nonmodal features are, they are grounded in objects' spatio-
temporal properties and underlying matter.
Let's then consider candidate grounders. There are at least two gen-
eral requirements on grounders. The ﬁrst one comes from the grounding
relation. As I have mentioned, the strong notion of the grounding relation
asks for diﬀerent grounders when groundees are diﬀerent. But having cor-
responding diﬀerence is not suﬃcient for grounders. It is at least logically
possible that for some grounders, and their groundees, not only do diﬀerent
groundees have diﬀerent grounders, but diﬀerent grounders also have diﬀer-
ent groundees. If having corresponding diﬀerences is suﬃcient for grounders,
then the groundees also ground grounders. But the grounding relation is
asymmetric, which means groundees can never ground their grounders. In
these possible cases, what then makes the grounders diﬀerent from their
groundees? It might be suggested that the grounders and the groundees
have diﬀerent explanatory power: the grounders are able to explain their
groundees, but not vice versa. I am not sure whether explanatory power is
suﬃcient for separating the two, because the two might just have exactly the
same explanatory power. And yet, this is necessary for things to count as
grounders. It makes little sense if proposed grounders fail to explain their
groundees. Thus, besides the corresponding diﬀerences, the grounders are
also required to explain their groundees.
The above requirements are related to diﬀerences in groundees in one way
or another. The diﬀerences in groundees ask for corresponding diﬀerences in
grounders as well as explanations from their grounders. Hence the diﬀerences
in groundees matter. And in the light of this statement, in the grounding
problem modal diﬀerences play important roles in the above sense.
There are three modal modiﬁers: essentially, accidentally, and possibly.
Given the modiﬁers and negation, there are six forms of modal predicates:
essentially F, accidentally F, possibly F, not essentially F, not accidentally
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F, and not possibly F. The three modiﬁers are systematically connected in
the following ways:
• O is essentially F, iﬀ, O is F and O is not possibly non-F ;
• O is accidentally F, iﬀ, O is F and O is possibly non-F ;
• O is not essentially F, iﬀ, O is non-F or O is accidentally F ;
• O is not accidentally F, iﬀ, O is non-F or O is essentially F.
Given the above connections, the modiﬁer possibly is suﬃcient for charac-
terizing all modal features. Now consider how many kinds of diﬀerences in
modal features in terms of possibly F . I think the all diﬀerences in modal
features fall under one of the following:
• Being possibly F vs. being possibly G (F 6=G)
• Being possibly F vs. not being possibly G
The above use of diﬀerences in modal features may cause some confu-
sion. By this I mean that it might be mistakenly taken as modal diﬀerence
between objects, after all both are modal diﬀerence in some sense. The un-
derlying reason, I think, is that modal diﬀerence can be understood in two
ways. One is object-centered: modal diﬀerence is short for modal diﬀerence
between objects. Thus, a ball's being essentially round and a rock's not
being essentially round indicate a modal diﬀerence between the ball and
the rock. So are a ball's being essentially round and a rock's being
accidentally square, for an object's being accidentally square entails
its not being essentially round. The other way of understanding modal
diﬀerence is feature-centered: modal diﬀerence means diﬀerence in modal
features, and diﬀerent modal features are suﬃcient for this kind of diﬀer-
ence. Thus diﬀerent modal features such as being essentially round and
being accidentally red indicate modal diﬀerences. It is worthy empha-
sizing that the object-centered and the feature-centered understanding are
not equivalent. The latter subsumes the former, but not vice versa. This
is because the object-centered one requires two incompatible modal features
had by diﬀerent objects, while the feature-centered one does not. Use the
above example, being essentially round and being accidentally red
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can be instantiated by an object or by diﬀerent objects. Since the concen-
tration here is the relation between modal features and their grounders and
as I mentioned the relation is related to diﬀerence in the groundees, the
feature-centered rather object-centered understanding should be adopted.
Some diﬀerences in modal features are easy to be explained in terms of
the nonmodal. Suppose that one object O is F and another object O' is
G (F 6=G). Since O is F , O is possibly F . Likewise since O' is G, O' is
possibly G. Thus, the diﬀerent modal features of O and O' are explained
by their nonmodal features, being F and being G.
However, some modal diﬀerences are diﬃcult to explain. Suppose that a
non-F object O is possibly F and another non-F object O' is not possi-
bly F . Then what grounds O has being possibly F and O' lacks being
possibly F , given both O and O' are not F?9
9 It is worth mentioning that some philosophers take the essential/accidental distinction to
a global distinction. (For example, pan-essentialist think that if an object has a property,
then it has the property essentially. For them, all properties are had essentially. Extreme
haeccetists think that the connection between objects and their qualitative roles is loose.
For them, if an object has a qualitative property, then it has it accidentally.) They think
that: for all properties F and all objects O,
If F is an essential property and O is F , then O is essentially F ;
If F is an accidental property and O is F , then O is accidentally F .
According to this view, the second kind of modal diﬀerence (being possibly F vs. not
being possibly G) is:
• Being possibly F vs. not being possibly G (F 6=G)
For it is not the case that for some F , O is essentially F and O' is accidentally F , then
it is not the case that for some F , O is not possibly non-F and O' is possibly non-F .
Thus, when consider the grounding relation between the modal and the nonmodal, they
do not have the diﬃcult case.
Despite the above convenience, the global notion of essential/accidental distinction
has its own problem: it goes against with most of our modal intuitions. We are appealed
to think that, there are some F such that both essentially F and accidentally F
are instantiated. For example, we do think that a ball is essentially round and a
round rock is just accidentally round. Or at least, philosophers who endorse a global
essentially/accidentally distinction are invited to give an account of reconstructing modal
intuitions.
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For coincidentalists who think that one of the coincident objects is es-
sentially F while the other is accidentally F , the diﬃcult cases turn out
to be missions impossible. For not only are coincident objects both F , but
they also share all other nonmodal features, there is no way they can ground
the modal in the nonmodal. Thus (G1) is right, which leaves challenging
(G2) the only way of blocking (S2). Consider
(G2) Nonmodal features are the only candidate grounders of modal
features.
In order to falsify the above claim, coincidentalists need to ﬁnd other can-
didate grounders for modal features. And this is the partially-developed
strategy to block the second step of the grounding problem. Whether this
tentative answer works will be discussed in chapter 4.
2.4. The Third Step
The third step of the grounding problem is
(S3) Ungrounded modal features are problematic.
The reason why ungrounded modality is problematic is not modality's being
ungrounded. A thing's being ungrounded does not automatically entail
it is problematically ungrounded. Even anti-coincidentalists have to ad-
mit some ungrounded features are not problematic; otherwise the grounding
problem backﬁres.
The reason why ungrounded modality is problematic is modality's be-
ing ungrounded. According to anti-coincidentalists, modality is notoriously
mysterious, and thus need to be grounded in something else. And some-
thing else usually refers to nonmodal features of objects. Unlike modal
features, nonmodal features are empirically discernible. It seems that since
we have better epistemic access to things which are empirically discernible,
it is permissible to take them (or at least some of them) as ungrounded.
However, empirical discernibility may not be the only way of showing
that ungrounded features are not problematic. And if it is not, then the
grounding problem can be viewed as an invitation rather than a charge.
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Coincidentalists are invited to give an account, according to which, modal
features of objects, though ungrounded, are ungrounded in an unproblematic
manner.
There is indeed another way of making sense of ungrounded features. Con-
sider de dicto modality, it is thought that de dicto modality is mysterious
and thus need grounders. Nowadays, the standard treatment is reducing de
dicto modality to possible worlds. But we also don't have any empirical ac-
cess to possible worlds. If not empirical discernibility, what make(s) possible
worlds good candidate grounders of de dicto modality?
For example, consider the modal proposition that it is possible that cows
are purple. According to possible world semantics, the proposition is true iﬀ
there is a possible world in which cows are purple. Now someone might want
to ask what makes cows in that possible world purple while in our actual
world cows are brown? Moreover, she might think that except the colours
of cows, that possible world and our actual world are indiscernible, and thus
think that nothing could ground cows' being purple at one world and being
brown at another. If it is indeed the case, does it entail that, for example,
cows' being purple is problematic?
The answer is no. The ungrounded features can be well-explained by
using the principle of plenitude. The rough idea is that every possible way
is there: in some world, cows are brown; in some, cows are purple; in some,
cows are green; etc.. Since every possible way is included, there is nothing
fancy about purple cows, or brown cows.
Behind the above rough idea, there is a subtle distinction between the
questions about Fa on the one hand, and the questions about ∃xFx on
the other. Since Fa entails ∃xFx, but not vice versa; Fa is stronger than
∃xFx. By contraposition, a satisfactory explanation of ∃xFx may not be an
explanation of Fa. The question about why some particular cows are purple
may lack an answer, while the question about why there are some purple
cows may not.
But there is a question about the principle of plenitude. It is not clear
what it means. More precisely, in contrast with impossible ways, what are
the possible ways? There is no conclusive answer to that question yet. But
at the very least, the principle does ask for the principle of (re)combination,
and David Lewis is explicit about this point:
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To express the plenitude of possible worlds, I require a prin-
ciple of recombination according to which patching together
parts of diﬀerent possible worlds yields another possible world.
Roughly speaking, the principle is that anything can coexist
with anything else ... Likewise, anything can fail to coexist
with anything else. (1986: 87-8)
Nevertheless, only applying the principle of (re)combination to individu-
als of worlds is not enough. Consider those purple cows, they are not
(re)combinations of parts of worlds in the above sense; rather, if they are
(re)combinations at all, they are recombined by properties. Thus, the prin-
ciple of plenitude also requires a principle of recombination for properties.
However, a principle of recombination for properties, unlike its counter-
part, is hard to form. It makes little sense to say that any property can
coexist with any property, just consider being brown (allover) and being
purple (allover). It also makes little sense to say that any property can fail
to coexist with any property, just consider being purple and being coloured.
Given that there are properties always fail to coexist, and there are proper-
ties never fail to coexist, what constrains the recombinations of properties?
It is suspected that not only is primitive logical necessity required for this
very purpose, but also logical necessity alone is not suﬃcient for the purpose.
If that is true, then using a principle of plenitude may have a problematic
consequence.
Even though those who use the principle of plenitude have the burden
of replying to the above question, it would be too quick to conclude that the
principle itself is indefensible. Especially, in the above case, the principle
showed its ability of making sense of ungrounded features. So maybe we
should suspend this particular charge at the current stage, and try to see
whether a similar principle can make sense of ungrounded de re modality for
coincidentalists.
Actually, a principle of plenitude has already been suggested to coincidental-
ists, as a blocker of the grounding problem. Karen Bennett (2004b) argues
coincidentalists could try to make sense of ungrounded modality by claiming
that
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... every region of spacetime that contains an object at all
contains a distinct object for every possible way of distribut-
ing `essential' and `accidental' over the non-sortalish proper-
ties actually instantiated there. A certain principle of pleni-
tude holds; there is an object for each possible combination of
modal properties ... And precisely because each region is full
in this way, there is nothing in virtue of which any particular
object has the modal properties it does. There is nothing
special about Lump1 in virtue of which it has that property
and Goliath does not. It's just that all the modal bases are
covered. (2004b: 354-5)
Bennett is explicit about her use of this principle of plenitude. And for
her, applying the principle to coincidence is (re)combining modal properties.
With the principle, it is easy to answer the grounding problem: Goliath
and Lump1 exemplify two diﬀerent ways of combining modal properties.
Besides the two ways, there are other ways of combining modal properties;
and other combinations are also exempliﬁed, though by other objects, in
the same spatio-temporal region. Thus the two combinations exempliﬁed by
Goliath and Lump1 are not fancy at all, they are just two among the many.
In this way, the principle of plenitude makes sense of ungrounded modal
features. And this is the partially-developed answer to block the third step
of the grounding problem.
The above recipe is just a start of answering the grounding problem.
As I mentioned before, the principle of plenitude might commit to some
primitive modal features, e.g. logical necessity. In the de dicto modality
case, the commitment comes from the recombination of properties. There
are properties never fail to coexist and there are properties always fail to
coexist. Coincidentalists who use Bennett's recipe have a similar source of
the commitment. In their place, modal properties are (re)combined, and
there are modal properties always/never fail to coexist. Bennett herself
notices that it makes little sense to combine modal properties like being
accidentally coloured and being essentially grey together. Thus certain
modal features are needed to constrain the (re)combination.
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And yet, there are certain modal features might be wanted as further
constraints. Suppose that there are n nonmodal properties instantiated in
one spatio-temporal region, if unrestrictedly (re)combined, then there are 2n
objects in that region. Though given the above restriction, the number of
objects is less than 2n; there are still, using Bennett's characterization, an
awful lot of objects. Thus, Bennett suspects some coincidentalists wish for
a more chaste version of the recipe, according to which,
The only metaphysically possible combinations of modal prop-
erties are those that correspond to the sorts of things that we
standardly recognize. (2004b: 356)
For coincidentalists as such, they will need further principles to constrain the
(re)combination. And according to the further principles, it also makes little
sense to combine modal properties like being accidentally statue-shaped
and being essentially grey together (in Goliath and Lump1 case).
Now regarding the constraints on (re)combination, it is natural to raise
the following questions. Are these constraints themselves grounded or un-
grounded? Moreover, in what manner are these constraints being grounded
or ungrounded? If the constraints themselves generate similar grounding
problems, then coincidentalists are still haunted by the problem.
Diﬀerent constraints may have diﬀerent answers to the questions. The
use of logical necessity, for example, may be justiﬁed in the current case. This
is because, so far, no alternative account of this kind of necessity has been
proposed. In other words, it is not clear how to reduce logical necessity to
other things. Since everyone has primitive logical necessity, if it is a problem,
both coincidentalists and anti-coincidentalists would have it.
On the contrary, the constraint from kinds is utterly mysterious. Suppose
that principles are formed for this purpose, which I doubt, it is still puzzling
why modal properties like being accidentally statue-shaped and being
essentially grey cannot be combined together in Goliath and Lump1 case,
while modal properties like being essentially statue-shaped and being
accidentally grey can. Bennett also thinks that the chaste version of the
recipe has a very similar grounding problem, though at a diﬀerent place. The
chaste version, therefore, fails to give a satisfactory answer to the grounding
problem.
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In this way, we are able to see the side-eﬀect of Bennett's recipe, that
is to admit that there are an awful lot of (close to 2n) objects in a single
spatio-temporal region. By side-eﬀect, I mean that not everyone is happy
with this kind of abundance. Furthermore, the large amount of objects may
pose a diﬃculty for semantics: if there are so many objects in a single region,
how do coincidentalists pick, for example, Goliath and Lump1 among them?
Coincidentalists who use Bennett's recipe are invited to oﬀer a mechanism
for picking reference.
So far, Bennett's recipe seems defensible, at least in its metaphysical aspect.
Although the recipe has some odd consequences regarding the number of
objects, those odd consequences are not suﬃcient for knocking down the
recipe. There might be coincidentalists who are willing to trade the number
of objects for an answer to the grounding problem.
But is the recipe indeed a successful reply to the grounding problem?
I think the answer to the question depends on how the grounding problem
is understood. At the end of section 2.1, I mentioned that the grounding
problem is not just about de re modality, if modal diﬀerences are not the
only diﬀerences between coincident objects. In other words, if there are
other diﬀerences between coincident objects, then there are other grounding
problems awaiting for answers.
I do believe that Bennett's recipe oﬀers an excellent answer to the ground-
ing problem about de re modality. But even so, it is not yet clear how her
recipe helps to answer other grounding problems. But if Bennett's recipe
helps, it helps in either of the following two ways: one is to apply the same
strategy to diﬀerent topics, the other is to ground other features in unprob-
lematically ungrounded modal features.
Some coincidentalists, e.g. Kit Fine, would like to accept that there are kind
diﬀerences and evaluative diﬀerences between coincident objects. Thus, for
them, there are also grounding problems about kind and evaluative features.
It is relatively easy to ground evaluative features in kind features, for eval-
uative features are normally relative to respects, and in some sense, kinds
can be taken as respects. But, still, there is a grounding problem about
kind features: what grounds, for example, Goliath's being a statue and
Lump1's being a lump of clay?
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Let's ﬁrst consider whether applying the same strategy to a diﬀerent
topic helps. That is, whether the principle of plenitude helps coincidentalists
make sense of ungrounded kind features. As I said before, to apply the
principle of plenitude is to (re)combine certain things together. What, then,
are (re)combined in the current case? Surely it cannot be kind properties
themselves, for coincidentalists would not allow one thing to be both a statue
and a lump of clay. The only things can be combined here are certain non-
kind properties on the one hand, and kind properties on the other.
Is the (re)combination restricted? If it is not, that is any non-kind fea-
tures can be combined with any kind features, then there are odd combi-
nations. There are not just a statue and a lump of clay in the Goliath and
Lump1 case; there is a car coincide with both Goliath and Lump1 if being
a car is a kind property. I don't believe any coincidentalist is willing to
accept this kind of absurd claims.
Thus, the (re)combination must be restricted. A followed-up question is
how. By noticing that there are signiﬁcant non-kind diﬀerences between a
car and a statue, coincidentalists might want to propose a certain principle,
according to which, kind features are entailed by corresponding non-kind
features. But this option is not open to coincidentalists, otherwise Goliath
and Lump1 should share their kind features.
I have no idea how the restriction could be done through one principle or
a set of principles. If my hunch is right, then the (re)combination is utterly
mysterious. Moreover, even if I am wrong, and there are such principles,
what could coincidentalists say about the ontological status of those princi-
ples? It is still mysterious why those principles but not others hold. It then
seems that the principle of plenitude is not able to make sense of ungrounded
kind features directly.
Let's then consider the second way, that is, whether coincidentalists can
ground kind features in unproblematically ungrounded modal features. Ac-
cording to Bennett's recipe, if modal features of objects are ungrounded
in an unproblematic fashion, then there are close to 2n objects in a single
spatio-temporal region. Now a worthwhile question is how many kinds of
objects in one spatio-temporal region? Since coincidentalists as such would
not allow one object belongs to more than one kind, there are at most 2n
kinds of objects. Since coincidentalists as such accept kind diﬀerence be-
tween coincident objects, there are at least 2 kinds. Hence the number of
kinds is between 2 and 2n.
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If the number of kinds equals to the number of objects in a region, then
there are close to 2n kinds in a single region. Unlike close to 2n objects,
admitting close to 2n kinds seems to be a bullet coincidentalists cannot bite.
This is because kind is more or less type-wise. And it is odd to think that
any two distinct but nonmodally indiscernible objects do not share a kind-
membership.
Hence the number of kinds is smaller than the number of objects. In this
case, either only some privileged objects have kind membership, or diﬀerent
objects share their kind membership. If it is the former, then not only are
some objects kindless, but also only limited combinations of modal properties
can generate kinds. If it is the latter, then again only limited combinations
of modal properties can generate kinds, which is mysterious and thus leads
to a grounding problem. It should be evident by now that the coinciden-
talists cannot ground kind features in unproblematically ungrounded modal
features.
Since both ways do not work, Bennett's recipe fails to make sense of
ungrounded kind features of coincident objects. Thus, if coincidentalists
want to avoid the grounding problem about kind features, they need to reject
kind features radically. They may say that kinds are not part of metaphysical
reality, rather they are part of our concepts. Alternatively, coincidentalists
could just bite the bullet and admit there is a grounding problem about kind
feature; but at the same time, they argue that anti-coincidentalists have the
very same problem.
Thus it is not yet clear whether the grounding problem about kind features
poses diﬃculties for Bennett's strategy. Nevertheless, the discussion about
kind features does show one strategy of arguing against Bennett's recipe,
even though it has proved its eﬃcacy of making sense of ungrounded modal
features. In chapter 4, I use this strategy to argue that Bennett's recipe fails
to solve the grounding problem about trans-world relations. Since compared
with kind features, trans-world relations are much more diﬃcult to reject;
coincidentalists including those who use Bennett's recipe, are haunted by
the grounding problem about trans-world relations. Moreover in chapter 5,
I show that anti-coincidentalists can easily avoid the same problem. Hence,
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the grounding problem is very real for coincidentalists, and even Bennett's
recipe cannot give a satisfactory answer.
Upshot
For coincidentalists, there are three tentative ways of avoiding the grounding
problem. The ﬁrst is to diﬀerentiate coincident objects by modal features
without leading to modal diﬀerences. The second is to ﬁnd other eligible
grounders for de re modality. The third is to make sense of ungrounded
modality.
Whether the three tentative answers indeed work will be discussed in
the following chapters. Chapter 3 criticizes the ﬁrst answer, and chapter 4
criticizes the second and the third.
For anti-coincidentalists, their account of de re modality is constrained
by the grounding problem. They need to show that modality is either un-
problematically grounded or unproblematically ungrounded. Nevertheless,
anti-coincidentalists' account of modality is also constrained by the argument
from Leibniz's Law. Both constraints will be discussed in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 3
Differentiation and Difference
Abstract. One approach to the grounding problem is to block its ﬁrst
step. I have shown in section 2.2 that replies of this sort need to diﬀeren-
tiate coincident objects by modal features and to avoid modal diﬀerences
between coincident objects. The strategy is attempted by Theodore
Sider (2008), whose answer to the grounding problem is the focus of
this chapter. I ﬁrst present Sider's answer; I then form two independent
arguments to show Sider's attempt fails; at last, I generalize one of ob-
jections and conclude that for coincidentalists, blocking the ﬁrst step of
the grounding problem leads them to a dead-end.
3.1. Sider's Attempt
In section 2.2 I showed that if coincidentalists want to block the ﬁrst step of
the grounding problem, they need to argue:
(i) Coincident objects do not diﬀer modally; and
(ii) Coincident objects are diﬀerentiated by modal features.
As I mentioned earlier, arguing for (i) and (ii) at the same time is a prima
facie puzzling strategy. Nevertheless, Theodore Sider (2008) does take the
strategy seriously, and attempts to oﬀer a recipe of this kind for coinciden-
talists.
More speciﬁcally, Sider admits that strong global supervenience relation1
is held between modal features and nonmodal features of objects:
1...roughly: any nonmodal isomorphism from a possible world to a possible world is a
modal isomorphism. (Sider, 2008: 614)
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I grant Bennett and Shagrir's criticisms: if there really exist
modal properties and relations, and if these are not brute
(an assumption I will not question), then, I concede, these
must strongly globally supervene on nonmodal properties and
relations. (2008: 614)
And because of strong global supervenience of the modal on the nonmodal,
Sider denies any modal diﬀerence between coincident objects. More precisely,
according to Sider,
Strong global supervenience prohibits the existence of a modal
property had by one of Lump1 and Goliath but not the other.
(2008: 615)
And
In addition to requiring that nonmodally indiscernible objects
have the same modal properties, strong global supervenience
also requires that nonmodally indiscernible pairs of objects
stand in the same modal relations. (ibid.)
The above literature evidence shows that Sider does intend to argue (i), the
claim that coincident objects do not diﬀer modally. What about (ii)? Again,
let Sider speaks for himself:
But the coincidentalist does not want to utterly forsake modal-
ity. (It was modality, after all, that led the coincidentalist to
distinguish Lump1 from Goliath in the ﬁrst place.) (ibid.)
As should be evident, Sider also intends to argue for (ii) at the same time.
Thus Sider indeed tries to answer the grounding problem by blocking its ﬁrst
step.
Then what is Sider's speciﬁc recipe? Sider argues that the grounding problem
can be answered if modal properties are replaced by certain modal relations,
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i.e. opposite-possibly F and same-possibly F , since these modal re-
lations are able to diﬀerentiate coincident objects without leading to any
modal diﬀerence between coincident objects.
Let's take a close look at Sider's substitutes for modal properties. Sider
ﬁrst deﬁnes binary modal modiﬁers same-possibly and opposite-possibly as
follows:
x and y are same-possibly F iﬀ x and y are identical or coinci-
dent, and everything to which either is identical or coincident
is possibly F.
x and y are opposite-possibly F iﬀ x and y are coincident and
exactly one is possibly F. (2008: 617)
Sider then suggests that binary modal predicates such as same-possibly F and
opposite-possibly F denote binary modal relations being same-possibly F
and being opposite-possibly F . And these modal relations rather than
modal properties are used to account for modal features of objects.
According to Sider, his modal relations are analogous to the relation be-
ing opposite-handed and the relation being same-handed. Though the
instantiations of these relations are normally accompanied with the instan-
tiations of certain properties, i.e. being left-handed and being right-
handed; the instantiations of these relations do not require the instantia-
tions of corresponding properties. Consider a pair of simply-designed, indis-
cernible gloves, my left hand can wear either of them, which suggests that
there is no matter of fact about which glove is left-handed. In other words,
the property being left-handed is not instantiated by either of the gloves.
The same moral goes for the property being right-handed. Nevertheless,
the pair of gloves does instantiate the relation being opposite-handed
together and each glove instantiates the relation being same-handed to
itself, if being opposite-handed and being same-handed are relations.
Apply this reasoning to the relation being same-possibly F and the re-
lation being opposite-possibly F , they can be instantiated without the
instantiations of the property being possibly F and the property not be-
ing possible F . And this is the key reason why modal relations can replace
modal properties and account for modal features of objects.
According to Sider's deﬁnition, Goliath and Lump1 bear an opposite-
possibly relation, opposite-possibly surviving being squashed, since
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one is possibly surviving being squashed and the other is not possibly sur-
viving being squashed. An amorphous lump which does not coincide with
anything bears a same-possibly relation, same-possibly surviving being
squashed to itself, for it is possibly surviving being squashed.
Since there is no monadic property possibly F , but only binary relations
opposite-possibly F and same-possibly F , the semantic assignments of
possibly F  are governed by the modal relations opposite-possibly F and
same-possibly F . More speciﬁcally, according to Sider:
If x and y are opposite-possibly F , then every monadic
assignment must count one of x and y as being possibly F.
If x and y are same-possibly F , then every monadic assign-
ment must count both x and y as being possibly F. (2008:
619)
How do Sider's modal relations answer the grounding problem? Or put
it in another way: how do these modal relations fulﬁll requirements (i) and
(ii)? Opposite-possibly relations are used to diﬀerentiate coincident objects:
according to the deﬁnition of opposite-possibly F, only coincident objects can
bear opposite-possibly relations. Since coincidence relation is irreﬂexive, so
are opposite-possibly relations. Irreﬂexive relations are able to distinct their
relata. Thus, opposite-possibly relations oﬀer reasons to think coincident
objects are indeed distinct. The ﬁrst requirement is supposed to be fulﬁlled.
What about the other requirement, which does not permit any modal
diﬀerence between coincident objects? Firstly, since there are only modal
relations, there is no modal property that one of the coincident objects lacks
and the other one has. Secondly, Sider takes his modal relations to be
symmetric. Coincident objects x and y are opposite-possibly F iﬀ y and
x are opposite-possibly F , x and y thus do not diﬀer in opposite-possibly
relations they bear with each other. And the second requirement is supposed
to be fulﬁlled.
3.2. Against Sider I
Many questions can be raised against Sider's account. For example, it can
be asked how ordinary modal claims such as Goliath cannot survive being
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squashed is reconstructed. The constraint from being opposite-possibly
surviving being squashed is that only one of Goliath and Lump1 is pos-
sibly surviving being squashed, but the relation does not tell which one is
possibly surviving being squashed. Does that mean there are also claims like
Goliath can survive being squashed?
Moreover, it can also be asked about Sider's opposite-possibly relations.
Some philosophers2 think that relata are metaphysically prior to relations,
so the instantiations of irreﬂexive relations depend on the existence of nu-
merically distinct objects. If this is right, then Sider cannot use irreﬂexive
relations to show that there are distinct objects. Rather, in order to show
the instantiations of irreﬂexive relations, the existence of distinct objects are
required.
Though thought-provoking, the above questions are not knock-down ob-
jections to Sider's account. For the ﬁrst question, Sider has oﬀered an elab-
orated answer in his paper. Brieﬂy, Sider denies that ordinary names like
Goliath and Lump1 have determinate reference, and thinks the assign-
ments of names are coordinated with the assignments of monadic modal
predicates. In this way, Goliath and possibly surviving being squashed
will not be assigned together, and thus the sentence Goliath can survive
being squashed is never true.3 And as for the second one, Sider could just
deny the assumption that relata are metaphysically prior than relations.
There might be plausible ways of replying to the above questions. But
these questions and their answers should come only if it has been proved
that Sider's answer is successful. By this I mean that, if there are still modal
diﬀerences between coincident objects, then the ﬁrst step of the grounding
2The issue is implicitly discussed in the debate about the Principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles. See French (2008), Hawley (2009) and Saunders (2006).
3First, let monadic assignments assign referents to names. Second, when names are
penumbrally connected to monadic modal predicates (as 'Lump1' and 'Goliath' are con-
nected to 'possibly survives being squashed'), require assignments to coordinate what they
assign to names with what they assign to monadic modal predicates. Thus, a monadic as-
signment must assign to 'Lump1' whichever of our two objects it assigns as the thing that
possibly survives being squashed, and it must assign the other of the two objects as the
referents of 'Goliath'. As a result, sentences like 'Lump1 possibly survives being squashed'
and 'Goliath does not possibly survive being squashed' turn out supertrue, despite the
fact that neither 'Lump1' nor 'Goliath' has determinate reference; each denotes diﬀerent
things in diﬀerent monadic assignments. (Sider, 2008: 620-621)
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problem is not blocked. Thus, modal diﬀerences between coincident objects
alone are suﬃcient for knocking down Sider's recipe.
Now, the most signiﬁcant question is whether Sider succeeds in avoiding
modal diﬀerences.
Given that Sider's modal relations are symmetric, it is tempting to follow
Sider and think that coincident objects do not diﬀer in modal relations,
since coincident objects do not diﬀer in the relations they bear with each
other. Thus, Goliath bears opposite-possibly surviving being squashed
to Lump1; and Lump1 also bears opposite-possibly surviving being
squashed to Goliath. Furthermore, both Goliath and Lump1 lack possibly
surviving being squashed, because there are no modal properties at all.
Now, how could there be a diﬀerence?
Unfortunately for Sider, there are indeed modal diﬀerences. And the
diﬀerences are not diﬃcult to ﬁnd: If x and y are coincident, then according
to Sider, an opposite-possibly relation is used to diﬀerentiate them. In other
words, x and y bear an opposite-possibly relation to each other. Neverthe-
less, as I have shown above, opposite-possibly relations are irreﬂexive, so for
any object, it does not bear any opposite-possibly relation to itself. That
is why x does not bear the same opposite-possibly relation it bears to y, to
itself. Thus, x and y bear diﬀerent modal relations to x, and there are modal
diﬀerences between coincident objects.
Use Goliath and Lump1 as an illustration: according to Sider, Goliath
and Lump1 stand in opposite-possibly surviving being squashed. How-
ever, Goliath and Goliath do not stand in opposite-possibly surviving
being squashed. Therefore, Goliath and Lump1 bear diﬀerent modal re-
lations to Goliath, and there is a modal diﬀerence between Goliath and
Lump1.
The very same objection can be reformulated reversely. And surprisingly,
we can borrow Sider's own words against himself:
In addition to requiring that nonmodally indiscernible objects
have the same modal properties, strong global supervenience
also requires that nonmodally indiscernible pairs of objects
stand in the same modal relations. So the posited modal rela-
tions between Lumpl and Goliath must also hold between any
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pair of objects indiscernible from Lumpl and Goliath. Indeed,
since the pair <Lumpl, Goliath> is nonmodally indiscernible
from the pair <Goliath, Lumpl>, the posited relations must
be symmetric as between Lumpl and Goliath. (Sider, 2008:
615)
By using the same reasoning, we can get:
... since the pair <Goliath, Lump1> is nonmodally indis-
cernible from the pair <Goliath, Goliath>, the posited rela-
tions must be reﬂexive.
But not only, according to Sider's deﬁnition, are opposite-possibly relations
are irreﬂexive, but Sider also cannot aﬀord to take all modal relations to
be reﬂexive. Irreﬂexivity, after all, was the reason to think that coincident
objects are indeed distinct. Though formed in diﬀerent ways, both versions
show that from Sider's point of view, diﬀerence and diﬀerentiation are actu-
ally not compatible with each other.
According to Quine (1976), there are three grades of discernibility:
A sentence in one variable strongly discriminates two objects
if satisﬁed by one and not the other. A sentence in two
variables moderately discriminates two objects if satisﬁed by
them in one order only. A sentence in two variables weakly
discriminates two objects if satisﬁed by the two but not by
one of them with itself. (1976: 116)
The three grades above can be borrowed to analyze Sider's account. Suppose
the simplest scenario about coincidence4, that is only two objects coincide
with each other, then
4For the reason of this supposition, see the next section.
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(i) Since Sider denies all monadic modal properties and only accepts
modal relations between objects which occupy the same spatio-
temporal region and share the same underlying matter5, there is
no modal sentence in one variable satisﬁed by one of the coinci-
dent objects but not the other. Thus the two coincident objects
are not strongly discernible.
(ii) Since Sider's modal relations are symmetric, there is no modal
sentence in two variables satisﬁed by two objects in one order
but not in its reverse. That is to say, by using opposite-possibly
and same-possibly relations, the two coincident objects are not
moderately discernible. So far, so good.
(iii) However, since Sider's opposite-possibly relations are irreﬂexive,
there are indeed modal sentences in two variables satisﬁed by the
two but not by any of them with itself. That is to say, coincident
objects are weakly discernible by opposite-possibly relations.
In light of the above analysis, it is not hard to see that Sider manages
to lower the grade of discernibility from strong to moderate by rejecting
modal properties. and from moderate to weak by endorsing symmetric modal
relations. And yet, coincident objects are discernible in a weak sense; and as
I have shown, there are modal diﬀerences between these weakly discernible
objects.
A diehard6 may wish to disclaim the diﬀerences I found. She may say, for
example, that
Yes, Goliath bears opposite-possibly surviving being squashed
with Lump1. And although you are right about Lump1 does
not bear the same relation with Lump1, there is nothing that
I should worry about. Because Lump1 also bears opposite-
possibly surviving being squashed with Goliath, Lump1
and Goliath bear the same relation!
5See Sider's deﬁnitions of opposite-possibly and same-possibly.
6Thank Sonia for raising the issue.
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Figure 3.2.1. Three Spheres in a Triangle
I think the diehard is right about Lump1 and Goliath bear the same relation,
opposite-possibly surviving being squashed. But bearing the same
relations does not entail that there is no diﬀerence in relations. I realize that
this claim is a bit of puzzling, so I slow down and explain from the start.
Given a relation and its relata, there are two candidates for accounting
the diﬀerence in relations, one is bearing R simpliciter (R is a relation) and
the other is bearing R to a. If the former is used to account for the diﬀerence
in relations, then
(DR1) two objects diﬀer in relations iﬀ the two bear diﬀerent relations.
If the latter is used to account for the diﬀerence in relations, then
(DR2) two objects diﬀer in relations iﬀ the two bear diﬀerent relations
to the same objects.
Now the question is which one. Suppose, for reductio, that the former rather
than the latter is used for accounting for diﬀerence in relations, that is (DR1)
is right while (DR2) is wrong. Consider an universe where there are exactly
three spheres, a, b, c; these spheres are qualitatively identical, and they are
arranged in a right triangle: a is 3 miles from b, b is 4 miles from c, and c is
5 miles from a. (See Figure 3.2.1)
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Figure 3.2.2. Three Spheres in a Rectangle
According to (DR1), a and b diﬀer in relations, for a but not b bears the
relation being 5 miles from, and b but not a bears the relation being 4
miles from. So far, so good.
But suppose that later in the universe, a fourth sphere d, which is quali-
tative identical with a, b, and c, is added. d is 4 miles from a, 5 miles from b,
and 3 miles from c. Now the four spheres are arranged in a rectangle. (See
Figure 3.2.2)
According to (DR1), a and b now do not diﬀer in relations, for both a and
b bear the relation being 3 miles from, the relation being 4 miles from,
and the relation being 5 miles from. The original diﬀerence between a and
b is eliminated by adding an object! But neither a, nor b, nor c has moved.
If there is a diﬀerence between a and b in the right triangle, shouldn't there
also be a similar diﬀerence between a and b in the rectangle? After all, the
rectangle does contain the right triangle.
Unlike (DR1), (DR2) oﬀers plausible explanations: in the earlier right
triangle situation, a and b diﬀer in relations, because they bear diﬀerent
relations to c: a but not b bear being 5 miles from c, b but not a bear
being 4 miles from c. In the later rectangle situation, a and b also diﬀer
in relations. Similar to the triangle case, bearing diﬀerent relations to c is
suﬃcient for thinking that a and b diﬀer in relations. Moreover, the added
object, d, can also be used for showing that a and b diﬀer in relations: a but
not b bear being 4 miles from d, b but not a bear being 5 miles from
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d. Hence adding d does not eliminate diﬀerences between a and b, rather it
adds diﬀerences between the two objects.
This is why I think that (DR2) is better in accounting for diﬀerence
in relations. That is objects' diﬀerence in relations is better understood as
their bearing diﬀerent relations to the same objects. If I am right about this
point, then the diehard's objection is undermined.
There is another objection. The diehard would be knocked-down if she
grants the existence of fusions of coincident objects. Now if the fusion of
Goliath and Lump1 exists, let's call it Goli-Lum, then Goli-Lum has the
modal feature having its components being opposite-possibly sur-
viving being squashed. But neither Goliath nor Lump1 has the modal
feature. And yet, since Goli-Lum and Lump1 (or Goliath) occupy the same
spatio-temporal region and share the same matter, according to the deﬁni-
tion of coincidence, Goli-Lum and Lump1 (or Goliath) are coincident objects.
But these two coincident objects have diﬀerent modal features, which is the
price Sider's strategy cannot aﬀord.
It is should be clear by now that coincident objects bear diﬀerent modal
relations to the very same thing, and thus diﬀer in modal relations. This
is why the grounding problem can be reformulated for Sider: for any two
coincident objects x and y, what grounds that y but not x bear opposite-
possibly F to x, given that x and y occupy the same spatio-temporal region
and share the same underlying matter?
3.3. Against Sider II
The above objection, though devastating, is not Sider's only problem related
to modal diﬀerences. His opposite-possibly relations also commit him to a
dualistic view about coincidence. In other words, in order to avoid modal
diﬀerences, Sider needs to say that (i) there are coincident objects, but (ii)
there is no case in which three objects coincide with one another.
Proof. Suppose for reductio that there is a case in which object x, y,
z are coincident with one another and they do not diﬀer modally with one
another.
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Since x and y are coincident, there is an opposite-possibly relation,
say opposite-possibly G, borne by x and y. Meanwhile, since y and z
are modally indiscernible, x and z bear opposite-possibly G with each
other. Similarly, since x and y are modally indiscernible, y and z also bear
opposite-possibly G with each other.
Now according to the deﬁnition of opposite-possibly, either x is possibly
G, or x is not possibly G.
Suppose that x is possibly G, since x and y are opposite-possibly G, y
is not possibly G. Likewise, since x and z are opposite-possibly G, z is not
possibly G ; since y and z are opposite-possibly G and y is not possibly
G, z is possibly G. Thus, if x is possibly G, then z is and is not possibly G.
Suppose that that x is not possibly G, since x and y are opposite-
possibly G, y is possibly G. Likewise, since x and z are opposite-possibly
G, z is also possibly G ; since y and z are opposite-possibly G and y is
possibly G, z is not possibly G. Thus, if x is not possibly G, then z is and is
not possibly G.
Either way, z is and is not possibly G. The suppositions lead to a con-
tradiction.
Therefore, if coincident objects do not diﬀer modally, then there is no
case in which more than two objects coincide with one another. 
Sider might be willing to restrict the number of coincident objects to 2 in
every case of coincidence. But this commitment is problematic, because it is
easy to ﬁnd cases, even cases about statues, in which more than two objects
coincide with one another:
Case 1. Mona Lisa stamp: (i) First consider a picture of Mona Lisa,
coincidentalists would say that there is one picture of Mona Lisa
and one piece of paper, the former but not the latter essentially has a
certain pigment arrangement; and the picture and the piece coincide
with each other. (ii) Then consider a stamp; coincidentalists would
say that there is a stamp and one piece of paper, the former but not
the latter is essentially shaped with perforations; the stamp and the
piece coincide with each other. (iii) Finally, consider a Mona Lisa
stamp, normally coincidentalists would say that there are a picture of
Mona Lisa, a stamp and a piece of paper coincide with one another.
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For the picture and the stamp are not identical: a picture of Mona
Lisa is not essentially shaped with perforations, and a stamp does
not essentially have the pigment arrangement for Mona Lisa.
Case 2. World Cup: Similarly, ﬁrst consider 2010 World Cup (which is
not cup-shaped); then consider an alloy cup; at last, consider 1962
World Cup (which is cup-shaped). A piece of alloy, a trophy and a
cup coincide with one another.
Case 3. Performance Artist: Similarly, ﬁrst consider a person; then con-
sider a statue; at last consider a performance artist who is statue-
shaped. A person, a body and a statue coincide with one another.
Case 4. Statue-shaped Weight: Similarly, ﬁrst consider a statue-shaped
alloy; then consider an alloy weight; at last, consider a statue-shaped
weight which is made of alloy. One statue, one piece of alloy, and
one weight coincide with one another.
Case 5. Statue-shaped Coin: Similarly, ﬁrst consider a statue-shaped al-
loy; then consider an alloy coin; at last consider a statue-shaped coin.
A coin, a statue and a piece of alloy coincide with one another.
Given the above cases, how could Sider keep his dualistic commitment if
he is willing to make one? The only way is to reject the existence of some
objects above. But which objects are rejected? I think any positive answer
to that question involve some arbitrariness. Coincident objects are thought
to be distinct because they are linked to diﬀerent modal intuitions. To reject
some but not all coincident objects above, a contrast within modal intuitions
is needed. By this I mean, only some modal intuitions are treated seriously,
they indicate opposite-possibly relations borne by coincident objects, while
other modal intuitions are ignored. But what make the ignored intuitions
the less privileged? And what are the metaphysics of these modal intuitions?
It is really hard to make good sense of the dualistic picture, and I think this
problem is suﬃcient to undermine Sider's account.
3.4. Generalization
I think either of the above arguments is able to show that Sider fails to block
the ﬁrst step of the grounding problem. But it might be suggested that
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the failure of opposite-possibly relations and same-possibly relations does
not mean the failure of other modal relations. So now, I generalize my ﬁrst
objection to all modal relations and thereby suggest the approach to block
the ﬁrst step is a dead-end.
According to Sider's deﬁnitions of opposite-possibly and same-possibly, if
two objects bear a modal relation, then they are either identical or coinci-
dent. This means his modal relations are always borne by objects occupying
the same spatio-temporal region and sharing the same underlying matter.
So let's ﬁrst consider the binary modal relations between objects
which occupy the same region and share the same matter. Is
any relation as such able to diﬀerentiate coincident objects without leading
to modal diﬀerences? The answer is no.
Suppose that there are only modal relations between objects occupy the
same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter. Sup-
pose further that coincident objects do not diﬀer modally. If two objects
occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying mat-
ter, whether they are either identical or coincident, then they do not diﬀer
modally. Thus,
(i) For all object x, y and all modal relations R, if x and y bear
R to each other, then x and y occupy the same spatio-temporal
region and share the same underlying matter. According to the
supposition, x and y do not diﬀer modally. So x and x also bear
R to each other. The posited relations are reﬂexive.
(ii) For all object x, y and all modal relations R, if x and y bear
R to each other, then x and y occupy the same spatio-temporal
region and share the same underlying matter. According to the
supposition, x and y do not diﬀer modally. x and y bear R to
each other, and x and y do not diﬀer modally, so x and x bear R
to each other. x and x bear R to each other, and x and y do not
diﬀer modally, so y and x also bear R to each other . Thus, if x
and y bear R to each other, then y and x bear R to each other.
The posited relations are symmetric.
(iii) For all object x, y, z, and all modal relations R, if x and y bear
R to each other, y and z bear R to each other, then x, y and
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z occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same
underlying matter. According to the supposition, x, y and z do
not diﬀer modally. x and y bear R to each other, and there is
no modal diﬀerence between y and z, so x and z also bear R to
each other. Thus, if x and y bear R to each other, y and z bear
R to each other, then x and z bear R to each other. The posited
relations are transitive.
Given reﬂexivity, symmetry and transitivity, no matter what the relations
are, they are equivalence relations. However equivalence relations are not
suﬃcient for numerical diversity. Consider identity relation, it is an equiva-
lence relation. Suppose, for reductio, that equivalence relations are suﬃcient
for numerical diversity, then identity relation is also suﬃcient for numerical
diversity. But this is a contradictory claim. How can the relata of identity
relation be both identical and distinct? Therefore, coincidentalists cannot
appeal to the modal relations between objects occupying the same spatio-
temporal region and share the same matter .
But what about binary modal relations between objects which oc-
cupy different regions and have different underlying matter?
The answer is no.
Recall that under this approach, coincident objects are diﬀerentiated by
a modal relation. The only way of diﬀerentiating coincident objects of using
this kind of relation is to show that coincident objects bear diﬀerent modal
relations to a third object. But if coincident objects bear diﬀerent modal
relations to other objects, then they diﬀer modally. Thus, coincidentalists
cannot appeal to modal relations between objects occupying diﬀerent spatio-
temporal regions and having diﬀerent matter.
What about binary modal relations without restriction on the
spatio-temporal region and underlying matter of relata? The
answer is no.
Suppose relations as such work, then for any two coincident objects,
either they are diﬀerentiated by relations between objects occupying the
same region and sharing the same matter, or by relations between objects
occupying diﬀerent regions and having diﬀerent matter. If it is the former,
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then a binary relation between objects occupying the same region and sharing
the same matter can be reformulated. The reformed relation is able to do the
work. Likewise, if it is the latter, then a reformed relation between objects
occupying diﬀerent regions and having diﬀerent matter can do the work. But
I have shown above, there are no such relations, so the supposition is false.
Coincidentalists cannot appeal to binary modal relations with no restriction
on the spatio-temporal region and the underlying matter of relata.
Now it is clear that all binary modal relations are not able to diﬀerentiate
coincident objects without leading to modal diﬀerences. But what about
n-ary relations (n > 2)? The answer is still no.
Suppose that coincident objects x, y are diﬀerentiated by one n-ary re-
lation (n > 2). At least one of the relata is neither x nor y, otherwise a
binary relation can be reformulated to do the job; and I have shown that
binary relations are not eligible. Furthermore both x and y are the relata
of this relation; otherwise the relation is not even relevant and how could it
diﬀerentiates x and y? Thus, if coincident objects x, y are diﬀerentiated by
the n-ary relation, then they can also be diﬀerentiated by a ternary relation
<x, y, <z1, z 2 , ..., zk>>, and neither x nor y appears in <z1, z 2 , ..., zk>.
However if the ternary relation above is able to diﬀerentiate x and y,
then the similar relation <x, x, <z1, z 2 , ..., zk>> is also able to diﬀerentiate
x and x. Meanwhile, since there is no modal diﬀerence between coincident
objects, the latter relation is indeed borne by x and <z1, z 2 , ..., zk>. And x
and x are indeed diﬀerentiated. This is a contradiction, thus the supposition
is false.
Suppose that coincident objects x, y are diﬀerentiated by n-ary relations
(n > 2). For the same reasons I stated above, which are to avoid binary
relations to be reformulated and to be relevant to x and y, there is a relation
borne by x, y and some other object among the diﬀerentiators. The relation
can be reformulated as <x, y, <z1, z 2 , ..., zk>> (neither x nor y appears
in <z1, z 2 , ..., zk>). Now, which relation(s), with the help of this one, can
diﬀerentiate coincident objects? The possible candidates are <x, x, <z1, z 2 ,
..., zk>> and <y, x, <z1, z 2 , ..., zk>>. But both would lead to modal
diﬀerences between coincident objects. Therefore, n-ary modal relations
cannot diﬀerentiate coincident objects without modal diﬀerences.
This ends the generalization.
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Upshot
Sider's modal relations fail to block the ﬁrst step of the grounding problem.
Furthermore, no modal relation can diﬀerentiate coincident objects without
leading to modal diﬀerences. The ﬁrst tentative way to avoid the grounding
problem fails.
Chapter 3 focus on only one way of replying to the grounding problem.
Thus, the failure of this reply does not entail that coincidentalists cannot
answer the grounding problem. For readers who have interests in other ways
of replying, please see relevant sections in chapter 2, chapter 4, and chapter
5.
CHAPTER 4
Modality and Trans-World Relations
Abstract. Chapter 2 shows that for coincidentalists, there are three
ways of avoiding the grounding problem. Chapter 3 criticizes the ﬁrst
way, and shows it leads to a dead-end. Chapter 4 deals with the sec-
ond and the third way, and argues that the grounding problem is very
real for coincidentalists. This upshot is reached in an indirect fashion:
By noticing a certain coordination between de re modality and trans-
world relations, I ﬁrst attempt to block the second step of the grounding
problem by grounding de re modality in trans-world relations. I then
argue that the attempt fails, for trans-world relations cannot be un-
problematically ungrounded. Finally, I show that coincidentalists have
an unsolvable grounding problem about trans-world relations, for those
relations can neither be unproblematically grounded nor be unproblem-
atically ungrounded. Hence, even if coincidentalists, e.g. those who use
Bennett's recipe, succeed in showing they don't have a grounding prob-
lem about modal features of objects, they still face a similar problem
about trans-world relations.
4.1. Grounding Modality
As I showed in chapter 2, the second step of the grounding problem is that
if there are modal diﬀerences between coincident objects, then modality is
ungrounded. One approach to the grounding problem is to block the step,
that is, to argue modal diﬀerences and grounded modality are compatible.
And the best way of showing the compatibility is to ﬁnd the eligible grounders
of modal features.
Since there are modal diﬀerences between coincident objects, no matter
what the grounders of modal features are, coincident objects also diﬀer in
those grounders. The reason is the generalization of why coincidentalists
cannot ground the modal in the nonmodal when there is no nonmodal diﬀer-
ence. Suppose coincident objects do not diﬀer in the grounders, then they do
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not diﬀer in the groundees, i.e. modal features. By contraposition, if coinci-
dent objects diﬀer in modal features, then they also diﬀer in the grounders
of modal features.
The grounders of modal features are either monadic properties or n-adic
relations. If they are monadic properties, then there is a property Goliath
has and Lump1 lacks, or Goliath lacks and Lump1 has, which grounds the
fact that Lump1 but not Goliath could survive being squashed. If they are
n-adic relations, then there is a relation and there is an object such that only
one of Goliath and Lump1 bear the relation to the object. And the relation
grounds the diﬀerent modal features had by Goliath and Lump1.
It is worth reiterating that oﬀering the grounders of modality might be
a vulnerable answer to the grounding problem. Because there are diﬀer-
ences between coincident objects in the grounders of modality, a similar
question can be raised: what grounds the grounders of modality? Surely the
grounders of modality can also be grounded in further grounders and the fur-
ther grounders can be grounded in even further grounders. But the tracing
must stop somewhere. In other words, if modality is grounded, then there
are ultimate grounders. These grounders ground modal features of objects,
but they themselves are not grounded in anything. Coincidentalists using
the strategy still have to accept some ungrounded features of objects. And if
these features are ungrounded in a problematic fashion, then coincidentalists
are still haunted by the grounding problem.
Good news for coincidentalists: that a thing is ungrounded does not auto-
matically entail it is problematically ungrounded. Even anti-coincidentalists
have to admit that some ungrounded features are not problematic. The
above moral applies to them too: either modal features of objects are un-
grounded, or they are grounded by some ungrounded features. Either way,
there are ungrounded features. If an anti-coincidentalist does insist that all
ungrounded features are problematic, then she has a similar grounding prob-
lem. In that case, since every theory has the problem, no theory really has
the problem.
Hence, there are two tasks for the coincidentalists who want to block the
second step of the grounding problem: (i) they need to show in what are
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modal features grounded; (ii) second, they need to argue that the (ultimate)
grounders of modal features are ungrounded in an unproblematic way.
Now I attempt to produce a recipe for coincidentalists in fulﬁllment of the
above requirements.
Given possible worlds talk, there are trans-world relations between indi-
viduals in diﬀerent possible worlds. One noticeable phenomenon is that de
re modality is coordinated with trans-world relations, which can be captured
by the following scheme1: for all objects o, o*, for all properties F, and for
all relevant trans-world relations TWR,
(S) o is essentially F iﬀ o is F and for all o* such that oTWRo*, o*
is F.
o is accidentally F iﬀ o is F and there is o* such that oTWRo*,
and o* is not F.
There are several clariﬁcations regarding the above scheme:
(i) The scheme assumes possible world talk, which might need a defense.
Here I neither challenge nor defend the talk. My potential audience is the
group of people who are willing to accept possible world talk. Due to the
use of possible worlds in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language,
formal semantics, etc., the talk has already gain some currency among the
contemporary philosophers.
(ii) Those who agree with the use of possible world talk may still dis-
agree about the nature of possible worlds. Modal realists, e.g. David Lewis,
think that possible worlds are concrete, while modal ersatzists take possible
worlds to be abstract. The coordination characterized by the above scheme
is neutral about the nature of possible world.
(iii) The quantiﬁcation above includes both actual objects and possible
objects, a.k.a. possibilia. If not, there is no resource for thinking of objects
in diﬀerent possible worlds.
(iv) The trans-world relation, TWR, is not just any relation between
objects in diﬀerent worlds. For example, though similarity relation can hold
between objects in diﬀerent worlds, it is not a trans-world relation in the
1Some philosophers are explicit about the coordination, e.g. David Lewis, 1986 and L. A.
Paul, 2006a & 2006b.
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above sense. Only some relations between objects in diﬀerent worlds are
trans-world relations in this sense. For example, according to modal real-
ism with overlap, one individual can wholly present at diﬀerent worlds, so
there are trans-world identity relation between objects in diﬀerent possible
worlds. And trans-world identity is the paradigmatic trans-world relation.
But trans-world relations do not just include trans-world identity. This is
because some philosophers, e.g. Lewis, deny trans-world identity relation,
and oﬀer counterpart relation2 as an alternative. The substitute of trans-
world identity is also counted as trans-world relation. Though there are
various trans-world relations, the scheme above is neutral about the nature
of trans-world relations.
(v) The scheme is also neutral about the logical features as well as meta-
physical features of trans-world relations. That is the scheme itself does
not require trans-world relations to be reﬂexive, nor symmetric, nor transi-
tive. Also, the scheme does not inform us whether trans-world relations are
qualitative or internal.
One way of explaining the coordination is to say that de re modality is
grounded in trans-world relations. An F -object is essentially F, because it is
not trans-worldly related to any non-F object. And an F -object is acciden-
tally F, because it is trans-worldly related to some non-F object. There are
also other ways of explaining the coordination. It might be suggested that
trans-world relations are grounded in de re modality, or both de re modality
and trans-world relations are grounded in other features.
The ﬁrst explanation to the coordination oﬀers coincidentalists a ten-
tative solution to the grounding problem. Coincidentalists might want to
argue that modal features of objects are grounded in trans-world relations.
And trans-world relations ground the fact that Lump1 but not Goliath could
survive being squashed: Lump1 but not Goliath is trans-worldly related to
some squashed objects.
As I argued, ﬁnding grounders for modal features is just a start, since
coincidentalists also need to show that the grounders themselves do not have
a similar grounding problem. One way of doing that is to ﬁnd something
else to ground trans-world relations, and show it is not problematic for the
grounders of trans-world relations to be ungrounded. But this is less relevant
2Lewis's counterpart relations are underpinned by similarities relations. But this does not
mean that similarities relations themselves are trans-world relations.
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to the current discussion. Given the transitivity of the grounding relation,
if trans-world relations are just media, why not appeal to the grounders of
trans-world relations directly, which falls under the third way of explain-
ing the coordination?Another way of blocking the grounding problem for
trans-world relations is to argue that trans-world relations are ungrounded
in an unproblematical fashion. Let's see whether trans-world relations can
be unproblematically ungrounded.
4.2. Trans-World Relations: Unproblematically Ungrounded?
In section 2.4, I showed two ways of making sense of ungrounded features.
One is appealing to empirical discernibility. The reason why the nonmodal
features of objects are good candidate grounders of the modal features of
objects is that the former are empirically discernible while the latter are not.
The diﬀerence in epistemological status privileges one over the other. The
other way is appealing to the principle of plenitude. Since every possible way
is there, no fuss should be made about some ways among them. The principle
of plenitude has already helped make sense of the candidate grounders of de
dicto modality, possible worlds. Furthermore, it has been used by Karen
Bennett (2004b) to defend ungrounded de re modal features of objects.
Are these two points able to help coincidentalists make sense of un-
grounded trans-world relations? Since we do not have empirical access to
transworld relations, empirical discernibility does not apply to this case.
Then what about the principle of plenitude?
As I showed in section 2.4, the principle of plenitude is rooted in (re)combination.
Now a natural question is: if the principle applies to ungrounded trans-
world relations, what are elements (re)combined? Coincidentalists cannot
(re)combine objects in diﬀerent possible worlds, for them if o and o* are
in diﬀerent worlds, then either o is trans-worldly related to o*, or not; o
and o* cannot be both trans-worldly related and not trans-worldly related.
Otherwise, given the coordination, one object is both essentially F and ac-
cidentally F, and the modal diﬀerences between coincident objects are just
illusions.
Notice that the whole proposal here is to ground an object's modal fea-
tures in the trans-world relations it bears to other objects in other worlds.
What matters in this scheme is not the identities of other objects, but rather
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the corresponding nonmodal features of those objects. And nonmodal fea-
tures of objects are grounded in the spatio-temporal properties and under-
lying matter of objects. Since coincidentalists already think that distinct
objects can occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same un-
derlying matter, spatio-temporal regions might be what are (re)combined.
Moreover, no matter what are (re)combined, the (re)combining relation
needs to be somehow related to trans-world relations between objects, the
relations proposed to ground de re modality. If not, the strategy would be
irrelevant to the current discussion.
By noticing all of the above points, I develop a recipe for coincidentalists:
I ﬁrst deﬁne transworld relations TWRR between an object in one possible
world and a spatio-temporal region in a diﬀerent possible world in terms of
trans-world relations between objects in diﬀerent worlds, TWR:
(TWRR) For any object o and any spatio-temporal region r, o and r are
TWRR- related, iﬀ, o is TWR-related to some object occupying
r.
I then apply the principle of plenitude to TWRR:
(PP) For all spatio-temporal region r, if it is occupied by some object,
then it is occupied by distinct objects for all possible ways of
TWRR-related to other regions.
The formulation above is not precise, because not everyone who accept pos-
sible worlds talk is a modal realist. For modal ersatzists, who think possible
worlds are not concrete, it makes little sense to say spatio-temporal regions
in possible worlds. But this does not mean that the recipe, if works, is not
available for modal ersatzists. Just like they have substitutes for concrete
possible worlds and concrete possible individuals, modal ersatzists have sub-
stitutes for spatio-temporal regions. The above recipe can be amended to
adopt ersatzists' taste. If modal ersatzists want to copy the above recipe, we
can amend (TWRR) and (PP) as:
(*TWRR) For any (actual or possible) object o, and any (real or ersatz)
spatio-temporal region r, o and r are *TWRR- related, iﬀ, o is
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TWR-related to some object which occupies r or is represented
occupying r.
(*PP) For all (real or ersatz) spatio-temporal region r, if it is or is
represented being occupied by some object, then it is occupied
by distinct objects for all possible ways of *TWRR-related to
other regions, both real and ersatz.
But modal ersatzists may want to privilege real spatio-temporal regions, as
they do with respect to the actual world. They may only want to admit
platitudinous objects in the actual world. And this wish is not diﬃcult to
realize. All they need to do is to amend (*TWRR) and (*PP) as:
(**TWRR) For any actual object o, and any ersatz spatio-temporal region
r, o and r are **TWRR- related, iﬀ, o is TWR-related to some
possible object which is represented as occupying r.
(**PP) For all real spatio-temporal region r, if it is occupied by some
object, then it is occupied by distinct objects for all possible
ways of **TWRR-related to other ersatz regions.
So there are at least three ways of concretizing the recipe.
How does this recipe help coincidentalists answer the grounding prob-
lem? The complete answer is: Goliath and Lump1 have diﬀerent modal
properties, Goliath cannot survive being squashed whilst Lump1 can. Since
modal features of objects are grounded in transworld relations, Goliath can-
not survive being squashed because Goliath is not transworldly related to
any squashed object. Likewise, Lump1 can survive being squashed because
Lump1 is transworldly related to some squashed objects. Transworld re-
lations ground de re modality, but they themselves are not grounded in
anything. Furthermore, transworld relations are ungrounded in an unprob-
lematic way, because a certain principle of plenitude holds here. Besides
Goliath and Lump1, in the spatio-temporal region coincidence occurs, there
are awful a lot of objects which exhaust all the possible ways of transworldly
relating to objects with versatile nonmodal features.
The key of the above answers is the principle of plenitude. Without the
principle, there is little coincidentalists could say about why ungrounded
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features themselves are not problematic. Nevertheless, the same principle
might also cause problems for those who use it. By this I mean, the number
of objects might be too much even for coincidentalists.
Recall that in section 2.4, one consequence of Bennett's recipe is to ac-
cept that a very large number of objects exist. If there are n properties
instantiated in a spatio-temporal region, then the coincidentalists' number
of objects (in that region) might be very close to 2n . 2n might already be a
very large number for some. But if n is a natural number, then no matter
how large 2n is, there are still ﬁnite objects in any spatio-temporal region.
The same problem is more severe in my recipe. For most who accept
possible worlds talk, there is an inﬁnite number of possible worlds. And if
there is indeed an inﬁnite number of possible worlds, then there is also an
inﬁnite number of spatio-temporal regions for modal realists, and inﬁnite
number of substitutes of spatio-temporal regions for modal ersatzists. Now
according to my recipe, there are distinct objects for every possible way of
trans-worldly related to (real or ersatz) spaito-temporal regions, so there are
at least 2ℵ0 objects in a spatio-temporal region, if it contains some object.
2ℵ0 equals ℵ1, which is the cardinality of the continuum. In English, the price
of endorsing my recipe is to accept the existence of unaccountably inﬁnite
objects in a single spatio-temporal region. In Bennett's recipe, accepting
close to 2n objects is already quite disturbing. But comparing with ℵ1, 2n is
only one drop in the ocean. I do not believe anyone would feel comfortable
with unaccountably inﬁnite objects in one spatio-temporal region. It is then
hard to see how the principle of plenitude could help coincidentalists make
sense of ungrounded trans-world relations.
The failure of this particular strategy also casts doubt on coincidentalists'
second way of avoiding the grounding problem. It is now obscure how the
appropriate grounders can be found for de re modality. Coincident objects
share all their nonmodal features, thus all nonmodal features of coincident
objects are not suitable for the job. Moreover my recipe tries to appeal to the
nonmodal features of objects which are trans-worldly related to coincident
objects. But taking those features as the grounders of modal features of
coincident objects, as I argued, leads to an intolerable commitment about
the number of objects. Now it seems that for coincidentalists, the nonmodal
features of both actual and possible objects cannot help with grounding the
modal features of objects.
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Similar to the third way of avoiding the grounding problem (see section
2.4), even if coincidentalists ﬁnd the appropriate grounders and avoid the
grounding problem about de re modality, which I doubt, it is still not clear
whether coincidentalists as such are free from the grounding problem. This
is because coincident objects might also diﬀer in other features, and if they
do, there are similar grounding problems about those features. It is just
unclear whether a successful solution to the grounding problem about de re
modality also applies to other grounding problems.
4.3. Trans-World Relations: Grounded?
The failure of grounding de re modality in trans-world relations, unfortu-
nately, poses a problem for coincidentalists. Unlike nonmodal features of
objects, the reason why trans-world relations may serve as the grounders of
modal features is that coincident objects do diﬀer in those relations. For
coincidentalists who accept possible worlds talk, Lump1 but not Goliath is
trans-worldly related to some squashed object. Moreover, as I mentioned,
coincident objects' diﬀerences in a certain feature may lead to a ground-
ing problem about the feature. Thus, given coincident objects' diﬀerence in
trans-world relations, coincidentalists may also have a grounding problem
about trans-world relations. That is they may be asked what grounds, for
example, Lump1's being trans-worldly related to some squashed object and
Goliath's not being trans-worldly related to some squashed object.
The grounding problem about trans-world relations is very similar to
the grounding problem about de re modality; its goal is to show that coinci-
dentalists have to accept ungrounded trans-world relations, and ungrounded
trans-world relations are problematic. To avoid the problem, coincidental-
ists need either to show that trans-world relations are unproblematically
ungrounded, or to show that they are unproblematically grounded. Since
trans-world relations cannot be unproblematically ungrounded (see section
4.2), if coincidentalists fail to ground trans-world relations, then they have
a grounding problem about trans-world relations.
Can coincidentalists ground trans-world relations? Recall the coordination
between de re modality and trans-world relations:
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(S) o is essentially F iﬀ o is F and for all o* such that oTWRo*, o*
is F.
o is accidentally F iﬀ o is F and there is o* such that oTWRo*,
o* is not F.
The coordination suggests two ways in which trans-world relations might be
grounded: one is to ground trans-world relations in de re modality, and the
other is to ground both trans-world relations and de re modality in other
features.
Unfortunately, for coincidentalists, trans-world relations cannot be grounded
in de re modality. The reason is straightforward: two objects can share all
their modal features but diﬀer in the trans-world relations they bear. Con-
sider an object x, let Fe be the conjunction of all x 's essential features and
Fa be the conjunction of all x 's accidental features, then x is essentially Fe
and is accidentally Fa. According to the coordination, all objects which x is
trans-worldly related to are Fe, and some objects which x is trans-worldly
related to are not Fa. So far, so good. Suppose that there is an object y such
that (i) y is not trans-worldly related to x, and (ii) y and x are qualitatively
identical. Now consider another object x', (i) x' is trans-worldly related to
y plus all objects x trans-worldly related to, and (ii) x' and x are qualita-
tively identical. Ex hypothesi, x', like x, is essentially Fe and accidentally Fa.
Hence, x and x' share their modal features while diﬀer in the trans-world
relations they bear. If trans-world relations are indeed grounded in de re
modality, then objects like x and x' should be trans-worldly related to the
same objects. This is how we see that grounding trans-world relations in de
re modality leads to a contradiction.
What about other features? It is extremely hard to ﬁnd the appropriate
grounders. Objects bearing diﬀerent trans-world relations may just share
all their nonmodal, modal, and kind features. Due to the lack of the cor-
responding diﬀerences, nonmodal, modal, and kind features cannot ground
trans-world relations. But if all the above fail to do the job, what can ground
trans-world relations?
There is indeed one candidate grounder haven't been discussed yet. Ac-
cording to some philosophers3, trans-world relations are underpinned by
identity properties, a.k.a thisnesses or haecceities. One advantage of identity
3E.g. Plantinga (2003).
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properties is that there are indeed corresponding diﬀerences if two objects
bear diﬀerent trans-world relations. Hence, for any object o1, o2,
o1 is trans-worldly related o2, iﬀ, both o1 and o2 share their
identity property.
And o1 but not o3 is trans-worldly related o2 is grounded in the fact that o1
but not o3 share its identity property with o2.
Admittedly, trans-world relations may be grounded in identity proper-
ties. But this does not soften the grounding problem about trans-world
relations for coincidentalists. This is because identity properties are also
notoriously mysterious, and if ungrounded, they are ungrounded in a prob-
lematic fashion. Thus they are not suitable for ultimate grounders. More-
over, from the coincidentalists' point of view, identity properties also can-
not be grounded. If they are grounded by the nonmodal features or the
modal features of objects, then given the transitivity of the grounding re-
lation, trans-world relations are also grounded in the nonmodal features or
the modal features of objects. But as I showed above, trans-world relations
cannot be grounded in such features. If they are grounded by trans-world
relations, then the coincidentalists' answer to the grounding problem about
trans-world relations is circular, and thus unsatisfactory. Thus, identity
properties cannot solve the grounding problem about trans-world relations
for coincidentalists.
It now seems that coincidentalists cannot ground trans-world relations. More-
over, as I argued in section 4.2, coincidentalists also fail to show that trans-
world relations can be unproblematically ungrounded, they have to accept
those relations are ungrounded in a problematical fashion; and the grounding
problem about trans-world relations is very real for coincidentalists.
This conclusion has an unfortunate implication for the replies to the
grounding problem about de re modality. For even if coincidentalists suc-
cessfully avoid the grounding problem about de re modality, they still have
a very similar problem about trans-world relations. This is why, from a
broader perspective, Bennett's recipe (discussed in 2.4), though succeeded
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in making sense of ungrounded modal features, fails to eradicate the ground-
ing problem.
Upshot
Coincidentalists are not able to ground de re modality in trans-world rela-
tions and avoid the grounding problem (about de re modality). Nevertheless,
coincident objects' diﬀerences in trans-world relations lead coincidentalists to
another grounding problem, that is coincidentalists have to take trans-world
relations to be problematically ungrounded. And the unsolvable ground-
ing problem about trans-world relations jeopardizes all the ways of avoiding
other grounding problems. Hence, the grounding problem is very real and
coincidentalists' last hope of replying to the problem is to argue that anti-
coincidentalists also have the problem. Whether anti-coincidentalists indeed
have the grounding problem will be discussed in section 5.4.
CHAPTER 5
Anti-Coincidentalism
Abstract. Chapter 2 shows how anti-coincidentalists are constrained
by the grounding problem: in order to gain advantage by charging coinci-
dentalists with the grounding problem, they need to show themselves do
not have similar problems. In chapter 5, I ﬁrst discuss another constraint
on anti-coincidentalism, which comes from the argument from Leibniz's
Law. I then show, given both constraints, how anti-coincidentalists'
account about de re modality is developed.
5.1. The Argument from Leibniz's Law
The classical argument against anti-coincidentalism is the argument from
Leibniz's Law, which appeals to both ordinary linguistic intuitions and to
the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals. The argument got this name
because the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals is one direction of Leib-
niz's Law. The argument usually starts from a pair of conﬂicting linguistic
intuitions in the form of:
(1) s is p.
(2) t is not p.
where s and t are singular terms which refer to tentative coincident objects,
and p is a predicate. Then the argument moves from linguistic intuitions to
metaphysical claims:
(3) x has the property F .
(4) y does not have the property F .
where x , y and F are the referents of s, t and p respectively. The metaphys-
ical claims indicate that object x and object y diﬀer in F property. After
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that, the argument introduces the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals,
that is:
(PII) If x is identical to y , then for every property F , object x has F
if and only if object y has F .
Or equivalently (by contraposition):
(PII') If there is at least one property that x has and y does not, or
vice versa, then x and y are distinct.
It is entailed by (3), (4), and (PII') that:
(Con.) x and y are not identical.
And (Con.) is incompatible with anti-coincidentalism.
Similar to the grounding problem, the argument from Leibniz's Law can
be plugged with modal intuitions. Given the Goliath and Lump1 case, the
argument can start from the conﬂicting modal intuitions:
(1-a) Lump1 can survive being squashed.
(2-a) Goliath cannot survive being squashed.
which support:
(3-a) Lump1 has the property being capable of surviving being
squashed.
(4-a) Goliath does not have the property being capable of surviv-
ing being squashed.
Together with (PII'), (3-a) and (4-a) entail:
(Con.-a) Lump1 and Goliath are not identical.
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As with the grounding problem, the argument from Leibniz's law can
apply beyond de re modality; other features can also be plugged into the
argument. As Fine (2003) mentions, there are conﬂicting intuitions about
kind properties, such as Goliath is a statue, Lump1 is not a statue; there
are conﬂicting intuitions about evaluative properties, such as Goliath is
badly-made, Lump1 is not badly-made, Goliath is Romanesque, Lump1
is not Romanesque; there are conﬂicting intuitions about constitutional con-
ditions, such as Goliath is made of the piece of alloy, Lump1 is not made
of the piece of alloy; and there are also conﬂicting intuitions about mere-
ological conditions, such as the hand is part of Goliath, the hand is not
part of Lump1. The above intuitions suggest that coincident objects may
also diﬀer in the corresponding features. And those diﬀerences are equally
capable of showing the non-identity between coincident objects.
Notice that the argument from Leibniz's Law is also the start of the ground-
ing problem, that is, coincident objects have diﬀerent features and thus they
are distinct. Some might think that the grounding problem can be used
to argue against the argument from Leibniz's Law as a reductio. However,
the grounding problem, if successfully charged, only shows the problematic
consequences of thinking coincident objects have diﬀerent features. Those
consequences themselves shed no light on how to tackle the argument from
Leibniz's Law. And if there is no way of tackling the argument, then the
grounding problem, if it is a bullet at all, should be the bullet bitten by
everyone.
Indeed, the argument from Leibniz's Law is a very strong argument
against anti-coincidentalism. If (3), (4) and (PII') are true, then (Con.)
cannot be false. But anti-coincidentalists cannot accept (Con.), which is
incompatible with their position. So they need to take at least one of (3),
(4) and (PII') to be false. But which one(s)? (3) and (4) are supported
by robust intuitions (1) and (2). If (3) or (4) are rejected, then it seems
anti-coincidentalists commit to counter-intuitive claims. Furthermore, the
Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals is widely accepted by philosophers.
It is hard to make sense of claiming that an object both has and lacks the
very same property. It seems that the argument from Leibniz's Law does
cause a serious trouble.
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Luckily for anti-coincidentalists, there is a weak link in the above argu-
ment. Although, it makes little sense to argue that (Con.) is not entailed
by (3), (4) and (PII') because validity does hold here; and it makes little
sense to argue against the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals; it does
make sense to challenge the link between linguistic intuitions such as (1)
and (2) on the one hand, and metaphysical claims such as (3) and (4) on
the other. Indeed, in order to reach the ﬁnal conclusion about coincident
objects, coincidentalists need:
(i) the terms s and t (in s is p and t is not p respectively) refer to
the corresponding coincident objects, otherwise, the linguistic intuitions, no
matter how robust they are, are irrelevant to the cases about coincidence,
and thus are irrelevant to the dispute between coincidentalism and anti-
coincidentalism;
(ii) the predicate p signiﬁes the same property in s is p and t is not p.
If not, the metaphysical claim about x and y would be: x has the property
F ; y does not have the property F* ; and property F is not property F* .
This metaphysical claim, together with the Principle of Indiscernibility of
Identicals, are not suﬃcient to show x and y are distinct.
Accordingly, there are two lines for anti-coincidentalists to answer the
argument from Leibniz's Law, which is called respectively by Fine (2003:
209) referential shift and predicational shift. The former line is to argue
that singular terms like s and t do not refer to coincident objects. x and
y , though distinct, either occupy diﬀerent spaito-temporal region and diﬀer
in underlying matter, or are just non-material objects. The alternative line
is to argue that predicates like p do not signify diﬀerent properties in the
argument, and the antecedent of the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals
is not satisﬁed.
I will show how anti-coincidentalists ﬂesh out referential shift and pred-
icational shift in section 5.2 and section 5.3 respectively. Similar to the
previous discussion about the grounding problem, I will concentrate on the
argument plugged with de re modality, but mutatis mutandis, the discussion
applies to the argument plugged with other features.
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5.2. Referential Shift
As I mentioned above, two speciﬁc views can be characterized by the name
referential shift. The ﬁrst one is to argue that the singular terms in the
argument from Leibniz's Law refer to objects in a diﬀerent spatio-temporal
regions or with diﬀerent underlying matter. The second one is to argue that
(at least some) singular terms in the argument refer to abstract objects.
Let's consider the second one ﬁrst.
The target of the second strategy is the nature of the objects to which the
singular terms refer in the argument from Leibniz's Law. It might be argued
that the singular terms in the argument have non-standard referents, e.g.
senses; and the non-standard referents rather than the standard referents
are the candidates bearers of the corresponding properties. This strategy
is prima facie feasible. If non-standard referents are what the linguistic
intuitions are about, then the best the argument from Leibniz's Law can
show is that there is more than one abstract object, and this is compatible
with anti-coincidentalism about concrete objects.
Despite its prima facie feasibility, the strategy should not be considered
seriously by anti-coincidentalists. First, if the strategy is right about the
nature of objects in the argument from Leibniz's Law, then abstract objects
rather than material objects are the bearers of modal features, kind features,
etc.. If that is the case, then material objects only have their modal features
and kind features derivatively. However, de re modal features and kind
features are the paradigmatic features had directly by objects. It makes
little sense to claim, for example, Goliath (a material object) itself is not
capable of surviving being painted black, or is not a statue.
Second, consider parsimony. One virtue of anti-coincidentalism is it con-
tains less objects in ontology. But if anti-coincidentalists take bearers of
modal properties to be abstract, it is then hard to see the diﬀerence between
the two positions regarding parsimony. Anti-coincidentalists admit the exis-
tence of two abstract objects and one concrete object, while coincidentalists
admit the existence of two concrete objects. If coincidentalists do not ad-
mit the existence of the corresponding abstract objects, they even have less
objects in their ontology. Given the above two considerations, I view this
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strategy as a merely possible answer to the argument from Leibniz's Law,
and will no longer consider it.
The other strategy under the label of referential shift is to argue that the
intuitions are not about objects occupying the same spatio-temporal region
or sharing the same underlying matter. But before giving an answer under
this approach, let's ﬁrst detour to della Rocca's (1996) recipe for undermining
the argument from Leibniz's law.
Della Rocca argues that when the arguments from Leibniz's Law are
plugged with modal properties, these arguments are question-begging. Con-
sider one argument from Leibniz's Law:
(1) Goliath is essentially a statue.
(2) Lump1 is not essentially a statue.
Therefore,
(3) Goliath and Lump1 are not identical.
Della Rocca notices that the argument above is analogous to Kripke's clas-
sical case:
(4) Molecular motion is essentially molecular motion.
(5) Heat is not essentially molecular motion.
Therefore,
(6) Molecular motion and heat are not identical.
The argument (1)  (3) and the argument (4)  (6) have a similar form,
moreover, our intuitions support the premises in both arguments. The only
diﬀerence between the two is that in the Goliath and Lump1 case, it is unclear
whether Goliath and Lump1 are identical, while in the heat and molecular
motion case, we have a strong intuition against the conclusion (6).
If someone wants to save her intuitions about (4), (5) and (6), she needs
to challenge the validity of the argument (4)  (6). And suppose she succeeds
in doing that, then due to the similarity between the two arguments, the
strategy might also be able to challenge the validity of the argument (1) -
(3).
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Actually, Kripke does oﬀer a way of breaking down the argument (4) -
(6). The answer is built on the distinction between two uses of properties.
According to Kripke, we need to distinguish properties' use of ﬁxing the
reference of singular terms from properties' use of giving the meaning of
singular terms. Consider the term Phosphorus and the property being the
heavenly body which appears in the morning. The relations between
the term and the property are: the latter is used to ﬁx the reference of the
former; but the latter does not give the meaning to the former; otherwise,
beside Phosphorus, no object could be the heavenly body appears in the
morning, and this is unacceptable.
To apply the above distinction to the heat and molecular motion case,
we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd the property which is used to ﬁx the reference of heat.
Let's say the property is being sensed by sensation S. We then need to
claim the relation between molecular motion and being sensed by sensa-
tion S is that molecular motion is what in fact sensed by sensation S. Thus,
molecular motion and heat are identical. Furthermore, since the property
being sensed by sensation S, like the property being the heavenly
body which appears in the morning, is used to ﬁx the reference of term
heat, it does not give the meaning that producing sensation to S to the
term heat. With the subtle distinction between uses of properties, we now
have two ways of interpreting (5). It depends on whether heat is a rigid
designator. If heat is rigid, then (5) is understood as:
(5') It is possible that heat is not molecular motion.
But if heat is not rigid, (5) could be understood as:
(5) It is possible that something that is not heat, but is identiﬁed in
the same way as heat is, is not molecular motion.
Or more precisely:
(5 ') It is possible that something that is not heat, but is identiﬁed by
the property being sensed by S, is not molecular motion.
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If (5 ') or (5) explains the modal intuition (5), then heat in (5) does not
refer to heat, rather it refers to something sharing the identifying property
with heat. So, even if (5) holds, it is irrelevant to heat at all. And the only
conclusion could be drawn from the argument is that something which is not
the heat, is not molecular motion. The conclusion is compatible with (6),
and this is how intuitions about (4), (5) and (6) are all kept.
Della Rocca suggests that given the similarity between (1) - (3) and (4)
- (6), a similar answer is available for anti-coincidentalists to break down the
argument from Leibniz's Law. More specially, it can be argued that
(2) Lump1 is not essentially a statue.
can be understood in the following two ways:
(2') It is possible that Lump1 is not a statue.
when Lump1 is rigid. And
(2) It is possible that something that is not Lump1, but is identiﬁed
as Lump1 is, is not a statue.
when Lump1 is not rigid. Similarly, (2) and (1) together only show that
something other than Lump1 is not identical with Goliath. And the conclu-
sion is compatible with (3).
Does della Rocca block the argument from Leibniz's Law? I think the
answer depends on which general view of de re modality is adopted. If
an anti-coincidentalist denies the existence of de re modal features, and
think de re modal intuitions like (2) are underpinned by de dicto modal
fact like (2), then there is no way (3) can be concluded from (2) and (1).
On the contrary, if an anti-coincidentalist admit the existence of de re modal
features, and think that de dicto modal facts like (2) are suﬃcient for objects
like Lump1 to have certain modal features, then the argument from Leibniz's
Law left unscathed. In other words, even if Lump1 is not rigid and refers to
something else in (2), in (2) Lump1 could still be rigid and, again, Goliath
but not Lump1 has the modal property being essentially a statue. Thus,
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della Rocca's gloss works for anti-coincidentalists only if anti-coincidentalists
are willing to radically deny objects have de re modal features.
Now some may think that della Rocca oﬀers a third reply to the ar-
gument from Leibniz's Law. Maybe he does oﬀer a third solution to the
argument plugged with modal intuitions. But as I mentioned earlier, like
the grounding problem, the argument from Leibniz's Law is not just about
de re modality. Rather it can also be plugged with kind features, evaluative
features, etc.. And since della Rocca's strategy shed no light on how to break
other arguments from Leibniz's Law, I do not consider he has successfully
answered the argument from Leibniz's Law in general.
But della Rocca does give some hint on how to shift reference, and this may
help anti-coincidentalists answer the argument from Leibniz's Law. Recall
one argument from Leibniz's Law is:
(7) Goliath cannot survive being squashed.
(8) Lump1 can survive being squashed.
Therefore,
(9) Goliath and Lump1 are not identical.
Anti-coincidentalists could try to argue that (7) and (8) are understood as:
(7') There is an object x , such that it is identiﬁed in the same way
that Goliath is and it cannot survive being squashed.
(8') There is an object y , such that it is identiﬁed in the same way
that Lump1 is and it can survive being squashed.
The conclusion can be drawn from (7') and (8') is just:
(9') x and y are not identical.
And this claim is compatible with anti-coincidentalism. Figure 5.2.1 shows
what the argument from Leibniz's establishes if referential shifts occur. Ac-
cording to anti-coincidentalists of this kind, distinct objects can be
identified in the same way; and this is why, for example, Goliath and x ,
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Goliath 
x 
Lump1 
y Non-identity 
Non-identity ?
Identified in the same way Identified in the same way 
Figure 5.2.1. Referential Shift 1
 
Goliath/ Lump1 
x y Non-identity 
Identified in way 1 Identified in way 2
Figure 5.2.2. Referential shift 2
Lump1 and y , can be distinct. Although the argument of Leibniz's Law suc-
cessfully shows x and y are distinct, it fails to show that Goliath and Lump1
are also distinct. After all, unlike identity relation, non-identity relation is
not transitive.
Since anti-coincidentalists think that Goliath and Lump1 are identical,
what really happens, according to anti-coincidentalists who use referential
shift, is like what ﬁgure 5.2.2 characterizes. And there is a consequence of
the strategy. Consider Goliath and Lump1, according to anti-coincidentalist,
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they are identical; and given referential shift, this very same object is identi-
ﬁed in diﬀerent ways. Thus, for anti-coincidentalists who endorse referential
shift, not only can distinct objects be identiﬁed in the same way, but also
different identifying conditions can attach to the very same
object.
This consequence has a further implication. Standardly, identifying con-
ditions are linked to de re modal features of objects. More precisely, an
object is identiﬁed by certain properties because those properties are essen-
tial to the object. But anti-coincidentalists who use referential shift have to
reject the standard view; otherwise, diﬀerent identifying conditions lead to
diﬀerent modal properties, and the argument from Leibniz's Law reappears.
Thus, anti-coincidentalists need to cut oﬀ the connection between identifying
conditions and modal features of objects. And it is tempting to think that
the disconnection makes little sense, and referential shift does not work well.
Nevertheless, I think that anti-coincidentalists can reply to the above
charge. Consider pan-essentialism, according to this view, for all proper-
ties and all objects, if a property is had by an object, then the property
is essentially had by the object. If pan-essentialism is true, and identifying
conditions are underpinned by modal features of objects, then an object is
identiﬁed by all the (nonmodal) features it has. But surely requiring all
(nonmodal) features is too demanding. We don't know all the (nonmodal)
features of most objects, if all the (nonmodal) features are required for the
purpose of identifying, then most objects are left unidentiﬁed. Or consider
haecceitism, according to which, for all properties (except identity proper-
ties) and all objects, if a property is had by an object, then the property is
accidentally had by the object. If haecceitism is true, and identifying con-
ditions connect to the modal features of objects in the above way, then no
(nonmodal) property could be used to identify objects. Hence, besides anti-
coincidentalists' referential shift, there are at least two theories do not agree
with the connection between identifying conditions and de re modality. And
this may oﬀer a motivation to reject the connection.
Furthermore, pan-essentialism is congenial to anti-coincidentalism with
referential shift. Recall one argument from Leibniz's Law is:
(7) Goliath cannot survive being squashed.
(8) Lump1 can survive being squashed.
Therefore,
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(9) Goliath and Lump1 are not identical.
What would pan-essentialists say about this argument? Since any property
had by an object is essential to the object, so is Goliath's shape property.
Thus, Goliath cannot survive being squashed, and (7) is true. Likewise,
Lump1's shape property is also essential to Lump1, and (8) is false. Since
one of the premises is false, the argument from Leibniz's Law is not sound,
and (9) cannot be concluded.
However, we do have robust intuitions to support (8), so it would be bet-
ter if pan-essentialists could oﬀer an explanation to it. And pan-essentialists
could just borrow referential shift, and claim that there is another under-
standing of (8). That is when Lump1 is not rigid, (8) can be understood
as:
(8') There is an object y , such that it is identiﬁed in the same way
that Lump1 is and it can survive being squashed.
If object y is squashed, then y can survive being squashed, and (8') is
true. In this way, modal intuitions are saved. What about the argument
from Leibniz's Law? Well, if (8) is replaced with (8'), then the argument
from Leibniz's Law is not valid, and again (9) cannot be concluded. No
matter which gloss of (8) is adopted, from pan-essentalists' perspective, the
argument from Leibniz's Law fails to establish its goal.
Compared with pan-essentialism, haecceitism is less congenial to anti-
coincidentalism with referential shift. According to haecceitists, except iden-
tity properties, any property had by an object is accidental to the object,
thus both Goliath and Lump1 can survive being squashed. Since (7) is false
and (8) is true, the argument from Leibniz's Law is invalid. So far, so good.
But we also have strong intuition to support (7). And like pan-essentialists,
it would be better if haecceitists could oﬀer an explanation. But unlike pan-
essentialists, they cannot use referential shift to give an alternative under-
standing to (7). Suppose Goliath is not rigid, then (7) can be understood
as:
(7') There is an object x , such that it is identiﬁed in the same way
that Goliath is and it cannot survive being squashed.
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However, since shape properties are not identity properties, for haecceitists,
they are accidental to all objects which have it. It is then hard to make sense
of the claim that something cannot survive being squashed. And referential
shift fails to save modal intuitions for haecceitists.
There might be other ways of explaining modal intuitions for haec-
ceitists. But my concentration here is not haecceitism per se. All I intend
to show is that anti-coincidentalism with referential shift is perfect with
pan-essentialism. Although anti-coincidentalists of this sort don't have to
commit to pan-essentialism, combining the two accounts provides a good
way of breaking down the argument from Leibniz's Law. Furthermore, there
is an additional beneﬁt of the alliance for anti-coincidentalists. That is pan-
essentialists can easily ground modal features in nonmodal features of ob-
jects, and thereby avoid the grounding problem. This issue will be discussed
in section 5.4.
Last but not least, unlike della Rocca's recipe, the above answer to the
argument from Leibniz's Law is not just conﬁned to the argument with modal
intuitions. In other words, it can be used to break down any argument from
Leibniz's Law. For example, consider one argument plugged with intuitions
about evaluative features of Goliath and Lump11:
(10) Goliath is Romanesque.
(11) Lump1 is not Romanesque.
Therefore,
(12) Goliath and Lump1 are not identical.
Anti-coincidentalists could argue that the robust intuition about (11) is un-
derstood as:
(11') There is an object y , such that it is identiﬁed in the same way
that Lump1 is and it is not Romanesque.
What (10) and (11') show is that Goliath and y are distinct, which is com-
patible with anti-coincidentalism.
1I pick this one from Fine (2003).
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5.3. Predicational Shift
The standard answer to the argument from Leibniz's Law is predicational
shift. It is argued that the same predicate refers to diﬀerent properties in
two utterances in the argument from Leibniz's Law.
It is a common linguistic phenomenon that the same predicates refer to
diﬀerent properties in diﬀerent utterances. Consider:
(1) The doctor is green at her job.
(2) The patient looks green.
The meaning of the predicate green varies in diﬀerent utterances. This
suggests that, green signiﬁes diﬀerent properties, i.e. being inexperi-
enced, and being unhealthy, in the above utterances. Moreover, since
the predicate refers to diﬀerent properties in two utterances, the negation
of one utterance does not entail the assertion of the other. Consider a very
experienced doctor who is sick and looks pale, then it is false that the doc-
tor is green at her job, while it is true that the doctor, as a patient herself,
looks green. Under this interpretation, it is legitimate to say the doctor is
both green and not green. The conﬂicting linguistic intuitions are due to the
diﬀerent properties rather than the diﬀerence in certain properties.
The same kind of interpretation might be available for anti-coincidentalists.
Anti-coincidentalists could argue that the conﬂicting linguistic intuitions are
the results of diﬀerent properties of one object rather than diﬀerences in
properties between coincidental objects. Indeed, this proposal has been well
developed by several anti-coincidentalists2. Here, I show how David Lewis's
recipe undermines the argument from Leibniz's Law in this way.
Lewis endorses modal realism with counterpart theory. According to
this view, (i) possible worlds, just like our actual world, are concrete; and
(ii) concrete objects, both actual and possible, are world-bound. In other
words, no concrete object wholly presents at more than one world; and the
relations between objects in diﬀerent worlds are counterpart relations rather
than trans-world identity. Furthermore, Lewis thinks that de re modality is
underpinned by trans-world relations in the following way:
2See Gibbard, A., 1975, Contingent Identity, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187221.
Gupta, A., 1980, The Logic of Common Nouns, New Haven: Yale University Press. Lewis,
D., 1971, Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies, Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203211.
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An object is essentially F, iﬀ, all counterparts of the object
are F ;
An object is accidentally F, iﬀ, some counterparts of the ob-
ject is not F.
Consider one argument from Leibniz's Law:
(3) Goliath cannot survive being squashed.
(4) Lump1 can survive being squashed.
Therefore,
(5) Goliath and Lump1 are not identical.
According to Lewis's counterpart theory, premises (3) and (4) are under-
pinned by (6) and (7) respectively:
(6) All counterparts of Goliath are not squashed.
(7) Some counterparts of Lump1 are squashed.
Furthermore, Lewis's counterpart relations are underpinned by similarity re-
lations. In other words, an object is a counterpart of another object because
the two objects are similar in some respect. And since objects can be similar
in many respects as well as dissimilar in many respects, when diﬀerent re-
spects are stressed, diﬀerent counterpart relations are invoked. For example,
one way of interpreting (6) and (7) is:
(6') All statue-counterparts of Goliath are not squashed.
(7') Some lump-counterparts of Lump1 are squashed.
If (3) and (4) are underpinned by (6') and (7'), then Goliath and Lump1
can be identical. This is because the counterpart relation in (6') and the
counterpart relation in (7') are diﬀerent, and this argument from Leibniz's
Law should thereby be viewed as invalid.
Although Lewis is a modal realist, it is worth mentioning that his recipe is
also able to help ersatzist anti-coincidentalists undermine the argument from
Leibniz's Law. Modal realists and modal ersatzists disagree with the nature
of possible worlds. And because of this disagreement, they think diﬀerently
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about the relata of counterpart relations, if they accept counterpart relations
at all. Modal realists think that the relations are between concrete objects in
diﬀerent worlds, while modal ersatzists think that the relations are between
concrete objects in the actual world and abstract objects in a possible world3.
But the nature of relata does not prevent ersatzists from grounding their
counterpart relations in similarity relations. And it makes perfect sense for
them to explain (3) and (4) in terms of (6') and (7').
Furthermore, Lewis's way of answering the argument from Leibniz's Law
about de re modality can be extended to other arguments from Leibniz's
Law. For example, consider again the argument:
(8) Goliath is Romanesque.
(9) Lump1 is not Romanesque.
Therefore,
(10) Goliath and Lump1 are not identical.
What anti-coincidentalists could argue is that (8) and (9) could be under-
stood as:
(8') Goliath is Romanesque as a statue.
(9') Lump1 is not Romanesque as a lump of clay.
(9') can be made sense of in the following way: Romanesque as a lump
of clay is similar to Baroque as a glass of water or green as blood. It
just does not make any sense for something to be Romanesque as a lump of
clay. If a thing is Romanesque, it can only a Romanesque as a statue, or a
picture, etc.. Since nothing is Romanesque as a lump of clay, neither Goliath
nor Lump1 is Romanesque as a lump of clay. Thus (9') is true. Moreover,
since being Romanesque as a statue and being Romanesque as a
lump of clay are diﬀerent properties, (10) cannot be concluded from (8)
and (9).
3Some ersatzists may also think there are counterpart relations between abstract objects
in diﬀerent possible worlds. But this issue is less relevant here, because the concentration
here is the debate about concrete coincident objects.
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5.4. Anti-Coincidentalism and the Grounding Problem
It is now clear that anti-coincidentalism can survive from the argument from
Leibniz's Law either by using referential shift or by using predicational shift.
But as I mentioned in chapter 2, there is another constraint on the view, if
anti-coincidentalists wish to take advantage by charging coincidentalists with
the grounding problem. That is anti-coincidentalists need to show they do
not have a similar grounding problem. So far, there are three known ground-
ing problems for coincidentalism: the grounding problem about modal fea-
tures, the grounding problem about kind features, and the grounding prob-
lem about trans-world relations. Coincidentalists can answer the grounding
problem about modal features by using Bennett's recipe; they can avoid
the grounding problem about kind features by rejecting substantive kind
features; however, they fail to give a satisfactory answer to the grounding
problem about trans-world relations.
Let's ﬁrst consider whether anti-coincidentalists have the grounding problem
about modal features and the problem about trans-world relations.
Anti-coincidentalists with referential shift can oﬀer a very easy answer to
the grounding problem about modal features. As I mentioned in section 5.2,
pan-essentialism and anti-coincidentalism with referential shift are congenial
with each other. According to pan-essentialism, for any object o, and any
property F,
If o is F, then o is essentially F.
This claim oﬀers anti-coincidentalists a great advantage of grounding modal
features of objects in their nonmodal features. Anti-coincidentalists could
just say that o's being essentially F is underpinned by o's being F . And
in this way, anti-coincidentalists with referential shift could easily avoid the
grounding problem about modal features.
Are anti-coincidentalists with referential shift able to answer the ground-
ing problem about trans-world relations? Recall that according to pan-
essentialists, when we utter o is not essentially F , what we mean is not
that the rigid designator of o does not have the property not being es-
sentially F . Rather, we just mean that there is another object o', which is
identiﬁed in the same way as o is, and o' is not essentially F. Due to the
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diﬀerent treatments of diﬀerent types of modal intuitions, when allied with
pan-essentialists, even if anti-coincidentalists accept possible worlds talk in
general, they may wish to deny the following coordination between de re
modality and trans-world relations: for all objects o, o*, for all properties
F, and for all trans-world relations TWR,
(S) o is essentially F iﬀ o is F and for all o* such that oTWRo*, o*
is F.
o is accidentally F iﬀ o is F and there is o* such that oTWRo*,
o* is not F.
For diﬀerent types of utterances, i.e. utterances with modiﬁer essentially
and utterances with the modiﬁer accidentally, are not treated diﬀerently in
(S). Moreover, it would cause serious trouble if anti-coincidentalists of this
sort do accept (S). This is because, as I showed above, anti-coincidentalists
already admit that certain grounding relation holds between nonmodal fea-
tures and modal features of objects, which leads to the following coordina-
tion:
(S') o is F iﬀ o is essentially F.
(S) and (S') together entail a coordination between nonmodal features of
objects and trans-world relations: for all objects o, o*, for all properties F,
and for all trans-world relations TWR,
(S) o is F iﬀ for all o* such that oTWRo*, o* is F.
Given (S), as already illustrated in chapter 4, there are three possible expla-
nations. The ﬁrst one is that trans-world relations are grounded in nonmodal
features of objects. The second one is that nonmodal features of objects are
grounded in trans-world relations. And the third one is that both nonmodal
features and trans-world relations are grounded in something else. The ﬁrst
explanation does not work, because o's being F does not give a restriction
on how many other F -objects o trans-worldly relates to. Moreover, it seems
that anti-coincidentalists would not endorse the second explanation, even if
it is available. For nonmodal features of objects are empirically discernible,
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and thus are perfect for grounding other features; while trans-world relations
are notoriously mysterious, and thus need to be grounded. It makes little
sense to ground those objects that do not need to be grounded in those that
do need to be grounded.
Now it is clear that anti-coincidentalists with referential shift are well-
motivated to reject the coordination between de re modality and trans-world
relations. And they can make a further move, that is to reject substantive
trans-world relations. And without substantive trans-world relations, there
is no grounding problem about trans-world relations in the ﬁrst place.
Some might suspect that the same strategy could be borrowed by coinci-
dentalists to avoid the grounding problem about trans-world relations. That
is, coincidentalists could just deny there are substantive trans-world rela-
tions, and because there are no such relations, there is no grounding problem
about trans-world relations. Unfortunately, this recipe only works well for
anti-coincidentalism with referential shift. From pan-essentialists' point of
view, the potentialities of objects are conﬁned by their actual, nonmodal fea-
tures. And since actual, nonmodal features of objects are worldbound, so are
modal features of objects. Hence, it it rather strange for anti-coincidentalists
with referential shift to accept trans-world relations between objects in dif-
ferent worlds. On the contrary, coincidentalists think that the potentialities
of objects are not conﬁned by objects' actual, nonmodal features; otherwise,
Goliath and Lump1 should share all their modal features. And since modal
features of objects are not worldbound, it is rather strange for coincidental-
ists to deny trans-world relations between objects.
Anti-coincidentalists with predicational shift are also able to answer both the
grounding problem about modal features and the grounding problem about
trans-world relations.
According to Lewis's recipe, de re modality is grounded in trans-world
relations. Thus, if the grounding problem about trans-world relations is
solved, so is the grounding problem about modal features.
From Lewis's point of view, trans-world relations are counterpart re-
lations; furthermore, counterparts relations are underpinned by similarity
relations. Since similarity relations are grounded in the features of their
relata, and here the relevant features are nonmodal features, the ultimate
grounders of both trans-world relations as well as modal features of objects
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are the nonmodal features of certain objects. And this is how Lewisian
anti-coincidentalists answer the two grounding problems.
As should be clear by now, both styles of anti-coincidentalism do not have
the grounding problem about modal features and the problem about trans-
world relations. Let's then consider whether anti-coincidentalists have the
grounding problem about kind features.
Two options are open for anti-coincidentalists regarding objects' kind
features. One is to think that kind features are restrictive: one object can
only belong to one kind, (or one kind in the same hierarchy). Thus, Goliath
(a.k.a. Lump1) is a statue but not a lump of clay. The other is to think
that kind features are cumulative: one object can belong to diﬀerent kinds,
(or diﬀerent kinds in the same hierarchy). Thus, Goliath (a.k.a. Lump1) is
both a statue and a lump of clay.
Either way, anti-coincidentalists are able to ground the kind features of
objects in their non-kind features. They could claim that if two objects
are qualitative identicals, then the two objects belong to the same kind(s).
According to this claim, there are no objects sharing non-kind features while
diﬀering in kind features. Hence no counter-examples can be raised to refute
the grounding relation between kind features and non-kind features.
Some might think that cumulative kind is a better option for anti-
coincidentalists, because we do think that Goliath (a.k.a. Lump1) is also
a lump of clay. But intuitions as such can be reconstructed for those who
prefer restrictive kind by using referential shift. That is, Goliath is a lump
of clay is understood as something which is identiﬁed in the same way as
Goliath is, is a lump of clay. There might be other reasons to prefer one op-
tion to the other. But the issue is less relevant to our current concerns. Since
both can help anti-coincidentalists answer the grounding problem about kind
features.
In sum, the grounding problem about modal features, the grounding
problem about trans-world relations, and the grounding problem about kind
features do not backﬁre on anti-coincidentalism.
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Upshot
Anti-coincidentalists are able to undermine the argument from Leibniz's Law,
by either using referential shift or using predicational shift. One way to de-
velop referential shift is to endorse pan-essentialism; and one way to develop
predicational shift is to endorse David Lewis's counterpart theory.
Moreover, anti-coincidentalists are able to answer the grounding problem.
This is bad news for coincidentalists because not only do they fail to avoid
the grounding in every possible way, (see chapter 3 and chapter 4), but
they also cannot trivialize the role of the grounding problem by arguing that
anti-coincidentalists also have it. Thus the grounding problem is very real
for coincidentalists.
Conclusion
Given the discussion from chapter 2 to chapter 5, what has been established?
The answer may sound like a platitude. That is coincidentalists do have the
grounding problem (see chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, and section 5.4),
and anti-coincidentalists can undermine the argument from Leibniz's Law
(see section 5.1, section 5.2, and section 5.3). But in the process of reaching
this answer, I argued that both Bennett (2004b) and Sider (2008) fail to
solve the grounding problem for coincidentalists; I also developed referential
shift for anti-coincidentalists to answer the argument from Leibniz's Law.
Furthermore, the discussions from chapter 2 to chapter 5 show that there
are tight connections between coincidence and de re modality. Given the
argument from Leibniz's Law, coincidentalists prefer to think that modal
predication is constant, that is an object is never both essentially F and
not essentially F ; while anti-coincidentalists prefer to think the opposite,
that is an object can be both essentially F and not essentially F. Given the
grounding problem, coincidentalists need to take the modal features of ob-
jects and trans-world relations to be ungrounded; while anti-coincidentalists
are capable of grounding both in nonmodal features of objects.
Due to the above diﬀerences regarding de re modality, some might prefer
coincidentalism to anti-coincidentalism for the intuitive appeal of the con-
stancy of modal predication. Others might prefer anti-coincidentalism to
coincidentalism for grounded modal features.
It might be thought that there is a stand-oﬀ between coincidentalism and
anti-coincidentalism. I agree. For me, it is understandable if coinciden-
talists trade constancy of modal predication for grounded modality; and it
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is also understandable if anti-coincidentalists trade grounded modality for
constancy of modal predication.
It might further be thought that given the stand-oﬀ between coinciden-
talism and anti-coincidentalism, no evidence is found to settle the debate
about coincidence. And because there is no such evidence, we should endorse
either meta-ontological anti-realism or meta-ontological skepticism about co-
incidence. But I disagree.
In general, the stand-oﬀ between two opposing views does not entail that
no evidence is capable of settling the dispute. It just might be the case that
some evidence is underestimated while other evidence is overestimated.
But there is a better way of arguing against meta-ontological anti-realism
and meta-ontological skepticism about coincidence. Given the connections
between coincidence and modality, if there is no matter of fact whether
there are coincident objects, then there is no matter of fact whether modal
predication is constant nor any matter of fact whether modal features of
objects are grounded. In other words, if meta-ontological anti-realism is true,
then this anti-realistic view should expand to the metaphysical and semantic
debate about de re modality. Likewise, meta-ontological skepticism about
coincidence should also expand to the debate about de re modality. However,
the debate about de re modality, together with many other metaphysical
debates, are free from meta-ontological suspicion. Targeting the debate may
just make those meta-ontological dismissive attitudes pervasive. And this
may go too far.
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